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UMKC LAW REVIEW
Even those [associates] who seem to succeed often confess they
have been lured into a Faustian bargain and that for all their
material success, they have lost their souls.'
This quotation on lawyers selling their souls evokes the memory of an old
friend. After a full day of depositions in New York City, I looked forward to
seeing Joan, a rising star at a prestigious law firm. Joan suggested that we meet
at her office. At about 10:00 p.m., I arrived at an office teaming with associates
and support staff. When I asked Joan if the attorneys were trying to meet im-
pending deadlines, she responded in the negative, explaining that the associates
were on the "partnership track treadmill."
Joan then showed me the brief that she was writing. With cursory review I
was shocked to read poorly constructed arguments. What happened to the tal-
ented English major who worked as a professional writer before attending law
school? When I looked at her I knew the answer. She was exhausted.
Joan, like many other associates, had gotten swept into producing hours in
an hours derby. Chief Justice William Rehnquist captured how billable hour
requirements effectively quantify associate contributions. He noted that by re-
quiring 2000 billable hours, a firm is "treating the associate very much as a
manufacturer would treat a purchaser of one hundred tons of scrap metal."2 A
fiction writer made a similar .observation, comparing associates to pieceworkers
in a sweatshop.3
Over the last fifteen years, academics and practitioners alike have tackled
the abuses of hourly billing, a previously taboo subject.4 Starting with Professor
* Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. The State Bar of Texas Department of Research
and Analysis provided support and assistance for this project. In particular, the author thanks Don
Jones, division director for the State Bar of Texas, and Dr. Cynthia Spanhel, director of the De-
partment of Research and Analysis. The author also appreciates the thoughtful comments of pro-
fessors Timothy Floyd, Lisa G. Lerman, William G. Ross, and the attorneys who participated in the
survey and the pre-test.
1 BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT TASK FORCE, ABA LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT SECTION,
BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT: A REPORT AND PLAN FOR ACTION (Dec. 28, 1992) [hereinafter
BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT REPORT]. Expressing the same sentiment, in a chapter called "The
Almighty Billable Hour," a respected practitioner offers the following warning: "Lesson Seven:
10% of a lawyer's soul dies for every 100 billable hours worked in excess of 1,500 per year."
WALT BACHMAN, LAW v. LIFE: WHAT LAWYERS ARE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 107 (1995).
2 William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession: Dedicatory Address, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 151 (1987).
3 CAMERON STRACHER, DOUBLE BILLING: A YOUNG LAWYER'S TALE OF GREED, SEX, LIES, AND THE
PURSUIT OF A SWIVEL CHAIR 9 (1998). "My grandmother toiled in a sweatshop, but she was paid by
the piece ......
4 "Unethical billing by attorneys was once a taboo subject. It no longer is." William G. Ross,
Formulating Standards for Ethical Billing, 35 LAW OFFICE ECON. & MGMT. 301 (1994). See also
William Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2199, 2199 n.2 (1998)
(citing the "multitude of articles and commentaries about unethical and illegal billing practices").
For a listing of the scholarship and commentaries on over billing and other billing abuses, see
James P. Schratz, I Told You to Fire Nicholas Farber - A Psychological and Sociological Analysis
of Why Attorneys Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2211, 2214 nn.5-9 (1991).
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Lisa G. Lerman's provocative article on lying to clients5 and Professor William
Ross's fascinating studies of billing practices, various commentators have ana-
lyzed the dark side of hourly billing practices.
7
During the same period of time, commentaries and study reports have iden-
tified billing pressure as the key culprit responsible for attorney dissatisfaction.8
The data from the National Survey of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction con-
ducted by the American Bar Association Young Lawyers Division in 1984 and
1990 demonstrate that increases in hours worked and the resulting decrease in
personal time have become "major problems" attributing to serious levels of at-
torney dissatisfaction. 9 As the number of hours billed and worked has skyrock-
eted, attorneys experience a "time famine" in that they are "working harder to do
more in less time."' 0 This has led commentators to identify the hours as the "sin-
gle biggest complaint among attorneys" about the practice of law."
Although billable hour pressure has taken a toll on partners as well as asso-
ciates, 12 associates appear to be the most disenchanted casualties of the billable
hour derby. 13 In discussing attorney dissatisfaction, some authors have relied on
5 Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990).
6 WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF THE TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS
(1996) (reporting on the results of surveys conducted in 1991 and 1994-95).
7 E.g., Duncan A. Macdonald, Gross Profits: A Client's Perspective, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655
(1994) (discussing, from a general counsel's perspective, how hourly billing creates hostility and
cynicism); Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices,
20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 293 (1998) (practitioners noting that the "traditional hourly billing
method is under attack from market forces, technological advances, and most importantly, clients").
8 See, e.g., Chuck Coulter, Chair's Letter from Chuck Coulter, Muscatine, Iowa, 18 No. 2 LAW
PRAC. MGMT. 17, 17 (Mar. 1992) (noting that "[t]he billable hour has been identified as a primary
villain that requires lawyers to sacrifice themselves to their firms by working longer and longer
hours"); BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGES AND FAMILY
NEEDS, FACING THE GRAIL: CONFRONTING THE COST OF WORK-FAMILY IMBALANCE 13 (June 1999)
(stating that "the increased revenue that is necessary for high associate salaries and partnership
expansion leads to a demand for high billable hours, the narrowing of advancement opportunities,
increased professional stress, and unprecedented financial conflict between associates and part-
ners").
9 ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1990 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2 (1991) [hereinafter STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
10 Tina Gutierrez, "No Clean Socks ": The Crisis of Lawyer Dissatisfaction, 13 No. 2 LAW HIRING
& TRAINING REP. 2, 3 (Feb. 1993). The studies conducted by the ABA Young Lawyers Division
clearly showed that the average hours worked in 1990 was more than the average reported in 1984.
STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 6-7.
11 James J. Alfini & Joseph N. Van Vooren, Is There a Solution to the Problem of Lawyer Stress?
The Law School Perspective, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 61, 63 (1995-96).
12 In a 1997 National Law Journal sample survey of 3,400 partners in 125 of the largest law firms in
the nation, 72.9% of the respondents reported that "their workload prevents them from spending
enough time with family and friends." Chris Klein, Big-Firm Partners: Profession Sinking, NAT'L
L.J., May 26, 1997, at A1, A24. In the same survey, 42.6% of the respondents "reported that their
job had hurt their relationship with a significant other." Id.
3 Postings on popular associate web site reflect disillusionment. See, e.g., Richard Zitrin & Carol
M. Langford, Associated Stress Disorder: Stop Them Before They Bill Again, TEX. LAW., Oct. 4,
1999, at 16 (quoting one associate who compared billable hour work to a high school swimming
competition she used to hate: "see who can hold their breath and stay under water the longest").
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the results of studies of law students and attorneys, noting that there is a limited
amount of empirical data on the state of the profession. 14 In an attempt to help
fill the gap, I conducted an empirical study to gauge the effects of billable hour
pressure and practices on the current crop of associates.
The information obtained in my study provides guidance in both analyzing
problems and formulating workable solutions. For example, one expert asserts
that attorneys generally will not accept lower compensation to work less because
lawyers tend to be competitive and driven. 15 Another perspective is that Genera-
tion-X associates appear to be a different breed of attorney desiring a balance in
their work and personal lives. 16 Associates' opinions enable academics, law firm
managers and bar leaders to intelligently evaluate current concerns and shepherd
the future of the legal profession.
Even the names of web site contributors suggest that many associates are cynical about billable
hour practices and pressures. Member names on the RealGAs web site include "Billable Horrors,"
"Body Count Rising," "Golden Cuffs," "Legal Pimp," "Liabill," "Looking for Billables," and "The
Firm Owes Me." RealGAs, Member List, at http://clubs.yahoo.com/clubs.realgas?m (visited Dec.
1, 2000).
14 See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 873 (1999) (explaining that even law
professors "who are intensely interested in the work of lawyers - often do not have the training or
resources to conduct empirical research about the legal profession"). The lead article in a sympo-
sium issue of the Journal of Law and Health analyzed data on types of distress experienced by
attorneys. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1995-96).
Various nonprofit groups have also conducted surveys gathering information related to associate
satisfaction and attrition. For example, the National Association of Law Placement sponsored a
comprehensive study on associate attrition. See NALP FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDU-
CATION: KEEPING THE KEEPERS: STRATEGIES FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF ATTRITION
(Jan. 1998) [hereinafter KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT].
, Susan Daicoff, a law professor with a master's degree in clinical psychology, thinks that external
cures to professional dissatisfaction involving, among other things, lawyers working less, being less
money oriented, being less competitive, and mentoring other lawyers may be unworkable because
lawyers' personality characteristics include the need for achievement. Susan Daicoff, Asking
Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems
with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998). Although Daicoff refers to various studies on the psychological char-
acteristics of attorneys, she acknowledges that no empirical data has been collected regarding the
efficacy or feasibility of any of the proposed solutions. Id. See also Susan Daicoff, Articles Law-
yer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Profession-
alism, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 1337 (1997).
16 Speaking of associate attrition, Joel Rose, a legal consultant, referred to the "Generation-X fac-
tor" in stating that "law students coming out of college today possess different goals and aspirations
from those of many partners." Debra Baker, Cash-And-Carry Associates, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at
40, 42. Mary Rose Alexander, a partner in the Chicago office of Latham & Watkins and that firm's
national chair of firm recruiting, expressed a similar perspective. "Associates today are a lot more
concerned about other things, not just the practice of law. Putting in all these hours is not what
many of them intended to do. They may do it for a certain period of time, but the question is, do
they want to do it for a career?" Id. Attorney and legal consultant Austin Anderson chimed in,
recognizing that the 27- to 40-year-old group "is more committed to their personal lives" than the
50- to 65-year-old group. Id.
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Part I briefly describes the survey design and the general profile of the sur-
vey respondents. Part II discusses current billing practices and pressures ana-
lyzing the study results related to billing expectations and guidance as well as
firm culture and work alternatives. Using findings from the study, Part III con-
siders the detrimental micro and macro effects of increasing billable hour expec-
tations. Finally, Part IV proposes various steps and measures that can be taken to
address the negative consequences of emphasizing billable hour production.
I. STUDY DESIGN AND GENERAL PROFILE OF
RESPONDENTS
A. Methodology
The empirical study of the effects of billable hour practices on associates
used a mail survey. Cynthia Spanhel, director of the Department of Research
with the State Bar of Texas, assisted in preparing the survey instrument, in con-
ducting the survey, and in analyzing the results. The survey instrument was sent
to a sample of 1000 associates. The original sample for the survey consisted of
1000 randomly selected Texas attorneys (1) who had been licensed for ten or
fewer years as of June 1999,17 and (2) who were identified on the State Bar of
Texas membership file as working in private law firms with more than ten attor-
neys.1
8
The questionnaire was designed to obtain objective data on billing prac-
tices, the effects of hourly billing pressure, and firm culture.' 9 The questionnaire
included a section for additional comments. The letter transmitting the question-
naire assured the recipients that the responses would be anonymous. 20 The in-
structions asked all recipients to separately mail an enclosed postcard.2'
Additional copies of the questionnaire were sent to those persons who had
not responded. After the final follow-up mailing, the total number of persons in
17 Restricting the sample to attorneys licensed for 10 or fewer years helped filter out attorneys who
were "permanent associates" and attorneys who had attained partnership or equity status.
18 Limiting the sample to attorneys who work in firms with more than 10 attorneys eliminated solo
practitioners as well as many small firms that did not use hourly billing as the principal method for
billing clients.19 Before finalizing the questionnaire, a number of associates, practitioners and scholars critiqued
the questions in an informal pretest. Despite the efforts to eliminate all ambiguous questions, a few
respondents believed certain questions to be unclear. The comment section provided respondents
an opportunity to identify unclear questions and to provide explanations of their answers. A copy
of the questionnaire is reproduced in the Appendix to this article.
20 The transmittal letter also asked recipients not to complete the survey if they were not associates
currently using hourly billing. Rather, these recipients were asked to check the appropriate re-
sponse on the postcard.
2 The postcard permitted attorneys to indicate that they had returned their questionnaires or to
indicate that they were not returning their questionnaires because they were not associates using
hourly billing. Prior to the third and final follow-up mailing of the questionnaire non-respondents,
attorneys who indicated that they were not associates using hourly billing were replaced in the
sample by randomly selecting other attorneys from the original pool from which the sample was
drawn. Attorneys with incorrect addresses, attorneys who were deceased, and attorneys who de-
clined participation in the survey also were replaced in this manner.
2000]
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the sample was 883. Of that number, 487 recipients returned the completed
questionnaire. This means that the overall response rate amounted to 55.2%,
which is higher than response rates reported in similar mail surveys of attor-
neys.22
B. Sampling and Non-Response Errors
The survey results do not indicate a non-response or sampling error. A
possible non-response error relates to the fact that associates who are working the
hardest may not take the time to complete the survey form. However, this does
not appear to be the case for a couple of reasons. First, a large number of the
associates who responded were working long hours. Although associates in
larger firms reportedly work longer hours, 50% of the respondents were associ-
ates in the largest firm category, firms with more than 100 attorneys. Second, I
have observed that associates who are working hard think about their situation a
great deal and want the opportunity to vent, especially if providing information
may help in improving the situation for associates.23
The mail survey does not appear to suffer from sampling errors. In a num-
ber of respects the state-wide sample drawn from Texas state bar membership
records represents different sectors of private law practice. First, Texas is a di-
verse state, including rural areas, small towns and large cities. This survey also
obtained information from associates in both small and medium size firms, unlike
some other surveys that were limited to large firms. 24 This survey also provided
information on a diverse population 25 with different educational backgrounds.
26
C. Survey Timing and Bias
At the time that the mail survey was conducted, law firms were generally
benefiting from the healthy economy.27 While some firms, such as insurance
22 For example, in 1999, the Texas Lawyer, a legal newspaper, sent a salary and billing survey to
189 firms with 10 or more lawyers reported a 16.9% response rate. See Angela Ward, Firms Raise
the Roof: More Hours and Higher Rates Mean More Money for Texas Lawyers; Survey Methodol-
ogy, TEX. LAW., Mar. 29, 1999, at 21.
23 In the comment section of the survey, a few respondents indicated that they looked forward to
seeing the results.
24 For example, the Texas Lawyer has surveyed associates in the 100 largest firms in Texas. See
Angela Ward, Associate Quality of Life: Not So Low After All, TEX. LAW., Dec. 1, 1997, at 16.
Commentators have also focused on life in large firms. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, Symposium:
Attorney Well-Being in Large Firms, Choices Facing Young Lawyers - Introduction, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 869 (1999). The extensive, nationwide survey on associate attrition conducted by the NALP
Foundation for Research and Education was sent to "nearly 4000 law firms with 25 or more attor-
neys." KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 11.
25 The sample included a gender, racial and ethnic mix.
26 Some other surveys have been limited to graduates of particular schools. See, e.g., Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt and Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our Labors: An Empirical Study of the
Distribution of Income and Job Satisfaction Across the Legal Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342
(1999) (discussing a sample drawn from the University of Michigan alumni data).
27 The first mailing made in August 1999 asked that completed questionnaires be returned by Octo-
ber 15, 1999. The last follow-up mailing asked that responses be returned by April 14, 2000.
[Vol. 69:239
SOUL FOR SALE
defense firms, were dealing with cost containment measures imposed by clients,
many firms grew in terms of numbers and revenues. On a weekly basis, popular
legal newspapers bombarded readers with news of unprecedented firm revenues
and rising associate salaries. The unprecedented high salaries paid to associates
in the largest firms may result in those associates reporting higher levels of satis-
faction than they might if their salary increases had not been so dramatic.28 Sur-
vey results should be read appreciating the level of affluence enjoyed by associ-
ates in large firms. From an income standpoint, times are good for associates in
large firms. Presumably, an economic slowdown or recession will negatively
impact satisfaction if associates must compete for both jobs and work.
In preparing the survey instrument, I reviewed boxes of scholarship, stud-
ies, surveys and commentaries on the effects of hourly work, law firm econom-
ics, attorney satisfaction, and associate hiring, retention and attrition. Admit-
tedly, this review, coupled with my own experience in private law practice and
reports of others in private practice, left me with the opinion that many practitio-
ners were frustrated with billable hour practice and pressure. One purpose of the
study was to obtain data from a large random sample to test that opinion. For
comparison purposes, many questions were based on questions asked in other
surveys. Some of these questions, such as those related to satisfaction, may ap-
pear to have a bias in tone. I attempted to eliminate bias in the wording and pres-
entation of questions. 29 One preconceived notion I acknowledge is that the envi-
ronment and economics of law firms should foster ethical law practice.
D. Respondents' General Profile
The vast majority of respondents (92%) indicated that they were associates
on the partnership track. This compares to 3% who indicated that they were staff
attorneys not on the partnership track. One percent of the respondents work part
time, and another 1% work as contract attorneys. The remaining 3% checked the
"other" category.3°
The respondents' tenure with their firms ranged from 11% who had been
with the firm for less than one year to 4% who had been with the firm for more
than seven years. The median tenure was thirty-two months, and the median age
of the respondents was thirty-two years old.3' Approximately seventy percent of
28 Referring to the "associate salary issues going on right now and for the past 4 months," one re-
spondent noted that the timing would skew the survey.
2 Two respondents indicated that the survey reflected a bias. A third respondent commented on the
"leading nature of some questions." Another respondent stated that the survey "is likely to be
skewed because of value judgments implicit in many of the multiple choice answers." In survey
drafting, multiple choice questions which simplify the reporting of the results can actually eliminate
some researcher bias resulting from characterization of open ended questions.
30 Those respondents who check "other" described their position. These descriptions included a
range of positions such as "employee, but paid by the billable hour" and "associate, but no defined
partnership track."
" The following is an age breakdown by category: 34% were under 30 years old; 51% were 30-35
years old; 9% were between 36-40 years old; 4% were 41-45 years old; and 2% were over 46 years
old.
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the respondents were married.32 Five percent noted that they were divorced or
separated, and 24% were single or widowed.33
The respondents worked in firms of varying sizes located throughout
Texas. The respondents' locations resemble the general lawyer population con-
centration in those metropolitan areas that include the largest Texas cities.34
Exactly half of the respondents worked in firms with more than 100 attor-
neys ("Large Firms"), 27% indicated that they worked in firms with 25-100 at-
torneys ("Medium Firms"), and 21% worked in firms with 11-24 attorneys
("Small Firms").35 The median income of respondents was $82,418.
II. BILLING PRACTICES AND FIRM CULTURE
A. Current Hourly Billing Practices and Pressure
Attorneys may be surprised to learn that hourly billing first became com-
mon between the 1950s and 1970s.36 In the 1960s, commentators, management
consultants37 and studies 38 suggested that those attorneys who used hourly billing
in determining their fees made more than those who used other methods.39 Since
that time, hourly billing evolved into the most popular method that law firms use
to bill clients and evaluate the contributions of attorneys. Now technology, such
as computer software programs, enables firm managers to track the amount of
32 Of the total number of respondents, 32% indicated "married, no children," and 38% indicated
"married with children."
33 One respondent commented that "single without children" was a missing category.
34 Thirty-one percent work in the Houston/Galveston/Brazoria Metropolitan Statistical Area
("MSA"), 43% work in the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA, 16% work in the Austin/San Marcos/San
Antonio MSA, and the balance work in other areas in the state.
35 Although the sample was limited to associates working in firms with more than 10 attorneys,
approximately 2% indicated they worked in firms with less than 10 attorneys. Evidently, these
respondents firms lost attorneys after information was reported to the State Bar of Texas.
36 Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, supra note 6, at 17, 9-22 (providing an historical perspective on attor-
neys fees and hourly billing).
37 Id. at 17-19 (referring to commentators' and consultants' recommendations that attorneys use
timekeeping as a law office management tool).
38 For example, The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar, an American Bar Association study, as-
serted that attorneys who use time records to formulate their attorneys fees made more money than
those attorneys who did not. William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics:
A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Legal Services,
1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 379, 385 n.16 (1996).
39 Jones & Glover, supra note 7, at 294 (explaining why the transition from a fixed rate to hourly
billing was "relatively easy"). Based on attorneys' motivation, Professor Lisa G. Lerman charac-
terizes the choice of billing methods as being "driven by concerns about the lawyer's pocketbook,
not the client's." Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from a Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2187
(1998). Reportedly, corporate managers and members of the business community welcomed
hourly billing because it enables them to "correlate the 'product' that they were buying to the prod-
ucts that they themselves produced and sold." William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by
Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 11 n.64 (1991) (citing Mary Ann Altman, A Perspective - From
Value Billing to Time Billing and Back to Value Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 11 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989)).
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time firm attorneys bill and collect.40 Firm leaders use the billing information to
set billing targets or billing requirements for firm associates.41  Firm managers
may share this information with associates, circulating monthly sheets showing
,,42
associates "where they stand in the race to outbill their colleagues. This in-
formation creates a kind of "peer pressure" on the "underachievers. 43
Over the last thirty years, the billable hours have dramatically increased. In
the 1960s the median number of billable hours was approximately 1500 per year
for partners and associates.44 By the 1970s, the target for most firms was be-
tween 1600 and 1800 hours.45 During the 1980s and 1990s the number of hours
associates were expected to bill continued to increase. 46 The 1990 study con-
ducted by the A.B.A. Young Lawyers Division revealed that 45% of attorneys in
private practice billed at least 1920 hours per year, and 16% billed 2400 or more
hours per year.47 Since that time, the number of billable hours has steadily in-
creased.48
Firm managers communicate their billing expectations in different ways.
Some openly acknowledge the "minimum" number of hours that associates
should bill.49 Other firm managers deny that they have a minimum or quota, pre-
ferring to call the number of hours a "target." Even when firms deny the exis-
40 See, e.g., Angela Ward, Firms Shell Out for New Time and Billing Software, TEX. LAW., Apr. 20,
1998, at 4 (describing a new generation of billing software that includes data on profitability of
matters).
41 "The ever watchful, reporting computers push firm members to compete on hours and fees to the
detriment of service and responsibility." Louise A. LaMothe, Where Are We Going Anyway?, 19
No. 19 LITIG. 1, 2 (1992) (citing an attorney surveyed in connection with the Seventh Circuit's
Committee on Civility).
42 David Segal, In the Business of Billing? Lawyers Say a Rush for Money Is Shaking Profession's
Standards, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at HI, H4 (noting that most large corporate firms now
require that employees bill a minimum number of hours per year).
43 See Francis H. Musselman, Abandon the Billable Hour!, N.Y. ST. B.J., July/Aug. 1995, at 28
(noting that most firms publish internally the number of hours reported by timekeepers).
44 Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 925 n.l 13 (citing
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 192 (1989)).
45 Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, supra note 4, at 2203. "Not until the 1980's were
associates at major firms in New York and elsewhere normally expected to bill more than 1800
hours per year." Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, supra note 6, at 20.
46 "Between 1984 and 1989, the median billable hours recorded by all associates rose from 1738 to
1820." Ammee McKim, Comment, The Lawyer Track: The Case for Humanizing the Career
Within a Large Law Firm, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 167, 174 (1994) (citing THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 218
(1991)).
47 Schiltz, supra note 14, at 891 (citing ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIvISION, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, infra note 144).
48 See Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, supra note 6, at 2-3 (describing the trend using a 1995 consulting
firm survey which showed that average associates hours ranged from 1649 in Boston to 1907 in
Atlanta).
49 As part of the law school hiring process, firms typically complete a National Association for
Law Placement (NALP) Law Firm Questionnaire. In completing this form, hiring firms must
provide information on their firms, including the average annual associate billable hours and mini-
mum associate billable hours. Prospective employees can obtain the information in electronic and
print versions of the Directory of Legal Employers.
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tence of a minimum or quota, associates learn about the firm's expectations or
norms.
50
To satisfy billing minimums, quotas or targets, some attorneys operate as
"billing machines,"' billing all or most of the time they are at work. 2 Most at-
torneys do not function that way but devote a percentage of their time to non-
billable matters such as personnel issues, continuing legal education and client
development. Although the actual time devoted to non-billable hours will vary
from attorney to attorney and from week to week, as a general rule, experts ex-
plain that approximately one third of all work time is non-billable.53 Using this
formula, an attorney must actually work 2400 hours in order to bill 1600 hours.54
The number of hours an associate must work continues to increase as asso-
ciate salaries increase.55 During the last two years, hardly a month has gone by
without an announcement that larger firms were hiking associate salaries. 56 Re-
cently, the Silicon Valley firm of Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villenueuve
50 "Most law firns I know have quotas. Many firms deny they have such things, but everyone on
the inside knows they do. If associates are spoken to about their billings in any systematic way,
there is always a quota or a minimum of some sort. This may be true even when there is no official
policy - and even if there is an official denial of its existence." Michael Sean Quinn, Attorneys'
Fees and Lawyers' Billings: A Tale of Emperors' Old Clothes, ENVTL. CLAIMS J., Autumn 1997, at
131, 135 (reviewing WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOuR (1996)).
51 In a 1997 Associate Quality of Life survey of associates in Texas firms, one respondent stated
that he wished management would "treat mid-level associates as people who could 'grow' into
partners rather than billing machines." Ward, Associate Quality of Life, supra note 24, at 20.
As described in one commentary, "attorneys are now taught to live and die by the billable hour,
thereby taking billing to its outer limits." Elizabeth A. Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal
Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each Passing Hour, 20 STETSON L. REV. 419, 426 (1991)
(citing Chambers, Untangling an Unholy Alliance, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 13).
53 Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 39, at 14. As explained by one expert, "the reason
for the ratio is that clients are only billed for time actually spent on their matter" and not billed for
"down time" spent in other ways, such as keeping current in one's practice area and attending firm
meetings. Elena S. Boisvert, Is the Legal Profession Violating State and Federal Consumer Pro-
tection Laws?, PROF. LAW., Nov. 1997, at 1, 4.
54 Cf William Kummel, Deconstructing Law Firm Economics, 11 No. 1 ACCT. FOR L. FIRMS 5, 5
n. I (1998). "To produce 1,700 net billing hours per year requires an average of 37 hours per week
for 46 weeks per year, assuming six unproductive weeks per year (three weeks vacation as well as
one week each for holidays, illness and pro-bono work)."
55 "As associate salaries escalated, so did hourly quotas and hourly rates." James E. Brill, The Law
of Unintended Consequences, TEX. B. J., July 1999, at 679, 680. After years of "relative stability,"
associate starting salaries began to increase in 1996. Mark Hansen, Big Pay Day for New Associ-
ates, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1998, at 25 (describing a legal consulting firm's survey which revealed that
"the median starting salary for new graduates rose to $52,000 in 1996 for the first time since 1989,
when it stood at $50,000"). In Texas, the recent wave of salary increases started in 1998 when
Houston-based Vinson & Elkins raised its associate salaries 20% across the board. Brenda Sapino
Jeffreys, V&E Boldly Blasts Associate Salaries by 20 Percent, TEX. LAW., July 27, 1998, at 1.
Other large firms followed by announcing matching salaries for starting associates. Brenda Sapino
Jeffreys, Firms Contemplate Move to Match V&E's Associate Salary Hike, TEX. LAW., Aug. 10,
1998, at 2.
56 For example, for three weeks in a row, the Texas Lawyer reported on the associate salary hikes.
Inadmissable - Show Me the Money, TEX. LAW., Feb. 21, 2000, at 3; Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Let
the Games Begin: Andrews & Kurth Strikes First with 20 Percent Associate Salary Hike, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 28, 2000, at 6; Inadmissable - A Higher Power, TEX. LAW., Mar. 6, 2000, at 3.
[Vol. 69:239
SOUL FOR SALE
Franklin & Hachigian hiked the starting associate's salary to $145,000, sending a
"ripple through the legal industry." 57 As explained by a prominent legal re-
cruiter, as salaries continue to increase, firms face increased pressure to justify
these higher expenses. 58 "Subsequently, annual billable hours requirements have
risen, with those attorneys falling below the norm coming under closer scrutiny;
some are even subject to termination at one firm."5 9 Presumably, associates un-
derstand a firm's billing expectations and possible consequences of salary raises.
Some firms' managers have openly communicated that the salary increases
require that associates bill more hours. 6 Others speak more guardedly, indicat-
ing that increased salaries require attorneys to become "more productive" and
charge higher billing rates.61 Given that many clients are resisting billing rate
hikes, 62 salary raises are most likely to be covered by attorneys working longer
hours.
B. Study Results on Billing Pressure
Understanding the amount of time that it takes to fulfill hourly billing re-
quirements and targets prepares the reader for the analysis of the hourly lbilling
requirements and practices reported by survey respondents. Eighty-four percent
of the respondents reported that their firms have annual billable expectations for
associates. Of that number, the mean annual billable expectation for associates
was 1961 hours and the median was 1980 hours.63
As expected, the survey results indicated that the average minimum billing
expectation generally increased with firm size. At the same time, Table 1 shows
that a smaller percentage of Large Firms required over 2100 hours as compared
to Medium Firms represented by the survey respondents. 64
57 Debra Baker, Go West, Young Lawyer, A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 34.
58 Lauren Eaton Prescott, The Verdict Is In on the Great Pay Hike, TEX. LAW., Oct. 4, 1999, at S19.
59 Id.
60 For example the Texas-based firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld increased salaries for
those associates who bill 2000 hours. Inadmissible - The Big Leagues, TEX. LAW., Mar. 27, 2000,
at3.
61 As stated by Jack Kinzie, the partner in charge of Houston-based Baker Botts, "I think the in-
creased salary is going to have to be absorbed in part by higher billing rates and in part by lawyers
becoming more productive." Lisa M. Whitley, Will Bigger Salaries Lead to Bigger Billing Rates?,
TEx. LAW., May 29, 2000, at 37.
62 Michael D. Goldhaber, Are Salary Hikes Bad for Associates?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at A20
(predicting that increased hours is the most likely way that firms will pay for increases when the
economy slows).
63 This median and mean excludes part-time attorneys and one respondent who reported that the
annual minimum expectation was 4000. This outlier was not included in the calculations because
the number is unbelievable.
64 A Salary and Billing Survey conducted by the Texas Lawyer also found that the associates in mid
size firms billed on the average more than associates in the larger firms represented in the survey.
The mean hours billed by associates in firms with 30-49 attorneys was 40 hours a week compared
to 37 hours a week for associates in firms with 50-99 attorneys. Lisa M. Whitley, Legal Employ-
ment and Recruiting in Texas: Salary and Billing Survey: Will Bigger Salaries Lead to Bigger
Billing Rates?, TEX. LAW., May 29, 2000, at 40. In the Texas Lawyer survey, only 29 firms re-
sponded for a 15.3% response rate. Id. at 38.
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The data also revealed an interesting relationship between the billing ex-
pectation and the number of years that respondents had been licensed. The mean
billing expectation for the more recently licensed attorneys was actually higher
than the mean reported for attorneys practicing more than four years.65
On the other hand, a cross tabulation between income reported and the an-
nual billable expectation suggested that the mean billable hour expectation in-
creased as attorneys' incomes increased. For example, the mean annual billable
expectation for attorneys whose annual pre-tax income was between $50,000 and
$84,999 per year is 1939 hours, as compared to 1980 hours for attorneys whose
pre-tax income was between $85,000 and $124,999. 66
Table 1
Firm Size and Annual Minimum Billing Expectations
67
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms
(11-24 attorneys) (25-100 attorneys) (over 100
attorneys)
Beldw 1800 hours 15% 4% - - -
1800-1999 hours 46% 48% 49%
2000-2099 hours 22% 30% 47%
2100-2399 hours 10% 12% 4%
2400 hours and above 7% 6% - - -
The majority of respondents (57%) noted that the number of billable hours
expected was the same as what they learned during the hiring process. Another
40% may have been surprised when they started working at their current firm and
learned that the number of billable hours expected to advance was more com-
pared to what they learned during the hiring process. 68 This illustrates a kind of
recruiting ritual in which firms communicate lower billing requirements than the
65 The mean for attorneys licensed less than three years was 1967 hours per year, the mean for
attorneys licensed four to six years was 1962 hours per year, and the mean for those licensed more
than six years was 1944 hours per year.
66 The mean billable hour expectation continued to increase in the higher income categories, which
included fewer respondents. The mean annual billable expectation for attorneys making $125,000
to $159,999 per year was 2041 hours and the mean annual billable expectation for attorneys making
over $160,000 per year was 2075.
67 The table percentages exclude part-time employees and one respondent who noted that the firm's
annual billable expectation was 4000 hours a year. See supra note 63 (explaining the justification
for eliminating the 4000-hour outlier).
68 As explained by professors Richard Zitrin and Carol M. Langford, firms often "soft pedal" their
billable hour requirements when recruiting new associates, and some claim to have no "formal
minimums, but they strongly enforce billing quota once lawyers join their ranks." RICHARD ZITRIN
& CAROL M. LANGFORD, MORAL COMPAss 87 (1999).
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number actually needed for advancement. 69 Unfortunately, this can give rise to
associates feeling frustrated and possibly misled.7 °
As indicated by the number of hours that respondents reported billing, as-
sociates tend to actually bill more than the minimum billing expectation. The
average number of hours respondents reported billing during the first half of
1999 was 1030 (2060 hours if calculated on an annual basis).7'The income of respondents appears to be a related to the number of hours
billed. The mean number of hours reported billed increases as income in-
creases. 72 This suggests that pre-tax income, including bonuses, relates to the
number of hours billed by associates.
The study results do not support the commonly held belief that attorneys in
the largest firms are the ones who bill the most hours. A cross tabulation be-
tween the number of hours that respondents reported billing and the size of the
respondents' law firms revealed that average annual hours billed by those re-
spondents in Medium Firms was 2120, compared to 2079 hours reported by re-
spondents in Large Firms. 73 Fifty-four percent of the respondents in Medium
Firms billed more than 2100 hours per year; by contrast, only 48% of the respon-
dents in Large Finns billed more than 2100 hours annually.74 The next section
addresses the guidance that associates receive in billing time.
69 Anecdotal reports attributed some of upward adjustment of billable hour requirements to the
salary raises made by the largest Texas firms in .1999. At some firms starting associates learned
that they would be making more, but working more because the billable hour expectation was in-
creased. See supra note 60 (describing how associates in one large Texas firm only qualified for
the salary increases if they billed more than 2000 hours a year).
70 The NALP report on associate attrition and retention revealed how associates felt "misled" by
descriptions offered during the recruiting period, which "proved inaccurate." KEEPING THE KEEPERS
REPORT, supra note 14, at 14, 15, 34 (describing how associates felt misled by inaccuracies in areas
including "unrealistically low assurances (during recruiting) of billable and write-off expectations
and... promises of opportunities to engage in pro bono work that will be valued by the firm").
71 The median number of hours respondents billed for the first six months of 1999 was 1025 or
2050 hours if projected for a year. These figures only reflect the number reported by respondents
who work full time and derive 100% of their fees from billable-hour work. The calculations of the
mean and median excluded one respondent who reported billing 30 hours for the first half of 1999,
and one respondent who reported 4000 hours.
72 The following lists the mean number of hours billed by respondents for the first six months of
1999: 903 hours for respondents earning less than $50,000; 1022 hours for respondents earning
$50,000 to $84,999; 1058 hours for respondents earning $85,000-$124,999; and 1090 for respon-
dents earning $125,000-$159,999. Only two respondents who made over $160,000 reported their
hours billed.
73 These figures reflect an annual amount based on the six-month amount reported by respondents.
The mean for number of hours billed by respondents in firms with 11-24 attorneys was 1014 for six
months, or 2028 hours per year.
74 Cf Joel M. Reck, Identifying Obstacles to Professional Fulfillment and Working Toward Solu-
tions, BOSTON B.J., Nov./Dec. 1996, at 2, 27 (reporting that most of the associates who attended a
Boston Bar Association retreat reported that "formal standards or firm culture" required at least
2000 billable hours, with some associates billing 2400 hours and more).
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C. The Need for Guidance on Billing
Neophyte attorneys forge into private practice with little or no experience
in billing their time. Often associates start work with a "lecture" from a senior
attorney who advises associates to "[b]ill every minute... we'll adjust the bill on
the back end., 75 This approach to billing does not recognize the traps involved in
billing another attorney's time. First, it assumes that the supervisor possesses
enough information on the client's legal matter to evaluate intelligently the
amount of time expended. Second, the approach assumes that the supervisor can
ably sift through associate time sheets, which may be "propaganda piece[s]." 76
Finally, if the firm compensates a billing partner for the amount collected from
billed clients, the billing partner may be reluctant to write off associate time.77
Some senior attorneys may provide additional guidance on billing in in-
structing associates to "write down your time the same day, be honest, use good
judgment, and don't double bill., 78 This general advice gives associates unfet-
tered discretion because the rules on billing practices remain unclear. Even when
firm managers implement general billing guidelines, attorneys still have a great
deal of latitude in the way that they apply the guidelines. This was illustrated by
a management consultant who found a great deal of disparity in what firm part-
ners would bill for travel, even though the firm implemented a policy to bill for
travel time.79 Rather than leaving attorneys in a quandary on billing practices, 80
firm managers can clarify how and what attorneys should bill. This guidance can
75 Compare Joseph Calve, A Lawyer's Worth, TEx. LAW., Mar. 23, 1998, at 3 (referring to the
"stock lecture" that a senior litigation partner gave when the author started working as an associate
at a Wall Street firm), with Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra note 5, at 716 (describing the experi-
ence of a billing paralegal who reported that "partners told new lawyers and paralegals to keep
complete records of their hours and assured them that if, in reviewing the bills, the partners thought
the time was excessive they would cut the bills"). With the exception of one partnerwho carefully
checked each of the bills, the paralegal stated that partners "never cut time.... [U]sually they
didn't even look at the daily time sheets, but just made sure that the narrative was correct." Id.
76 Sara J. Berman-Barrett, Integrating Beginning Lawyers Into the Business of Law, 19 No. 5 LAW
PRAC. MGMT. 22, 26 (1993) (explaining that "an associate's timesheet is likely the major (and
sometime the only) tool a partner - the associate's boss - will ultimately use to evaluate, promote
and give raises or bonuses to the associate").
77 A billing partner would prefer not to write down time if the collections from the section or from
certain clients directly affects the partner's own compensation. On a firm-wide basis, a partner's
participation in firm profits creates an incentive to inflate or pad hours. Douglas R. Richmond,
Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The Ethics of Billing, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 261, 262
(1996). Presumably, partners' desire to serve and satisfy clients will cause partners to scrutinize all
time included in final bills.
78 John E. Morris, Writing Their Own Rules, AM. LAW., June 1995, at 5, 5 (reporting that a quiz of
29 associates from 22 large firms in nine cities revealed that firms have "precious few hard rules"
for billing).
79 Id. When a consultant put a complex but realistic billing hypothetical to partners at one firm, the
charges for one day's activity ranged from 1.5 to 7.8 hours.
80 "If partners in the firm are divided on [a double billing travel] issue, associates are placed in a
quandary. As employees, which boss should they follow? As professionals, what do they feel is
right? And if they do not double bill, how will they compete with other associates who do?" Ber-
man-Barrett, supra note 76, at 27.
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include written guidelines, training programs and formalized channels within the
firm for open communication.
D. Study Results Relating to Billing Guidance and Ethics Systems
In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey only 40% of the respondents indicated
that their firms had written billing guidelines other than those imposed by clients.
Thirty-six percent of the respondents reported that their firms had no such guide-
lines. This 36% can be coupled with the 24% who checked "I don't know." As-
sociates who don't know about guidelines or systems essentially operate in a firm
in which guidelines or systems provide no assistance. The fact that one quarter
of the respondents do not know about guidelines suggests a lack of communica-
tion within firms, a problem identified in other studies.8 1
The percentage of firms with written guidelines increases with firm size.82
On the other hand, the percentage of firms using written billing guidelines de-
creased as the billing expectation increased. Among those firms with a mini-
mum billing expectation of 2400 hours a year, only 8% used written guidelines.83
Undeniably, associates in those firms faced a great deal of pressure to bill with-
out the benefit of written guidance on billing. 84 Such an environment can lead to
questionable billing practices by some associates, putting more "conservative"
associates at a competitive disadvantage in billing.
The majority of the respondents (56%) agreed that "clear billing guidelines
would help eliminate questionable billing practices., 85  Seventy-one percent
81 E.g., KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 106 (noting the majority of the associates
in the focus group "feel communications from firm management or supervising partners could be
improved"). As stated in the Report of the National Conference on the Emerging Crisis in the
Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives - Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services:
One of the most common problems cited by participants from all but the small-
est firms was the breakdown of communication within the office. This was true
in several critical areas: Associates have little information about what is hap-
pening in the firm. Despite the fact that they sacrifice their lives for the chance
of financial and professional security with the firm, they are kept in the dark
regarding important administrative matters and their input is not sought.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: A NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE EMERGING CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVES - ITS IMPACT ON LAW
FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES, Apr. 5-6, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE
REPORT].
82 Forty-nine percent of the Large Firms used written guidelines, compared to 34% for Medium
Firms and 26% for Small Firms represented by the respondents.
83 At the other end of the scale, 67% of the respondents with a billing expectation of below 1800
hours work in firms with written guidelines. The percentage of firms with written guidelines
ranged from 37% to 43% for firms with annual billing expectations in categories from 1800 to 2399
hours.
84 Conceivably, written guidelines may hamper an associate's ability to meet high billable hour
requirements.
85 This 56% breaks down to roughly 18% who "strongly agree" and 38% who "somewhat agree."
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agreed with the following statement: "Clear billing guidelines would help attor-
neys who want to practice ethically."
' 86
Training on billing can also help attorneys who want to practice ethically.
The survey results revealed that only a small percentage of respondents received
more than two hours of law school or firm training on billing.87 Surprisingly,
35% indicated that the firm provided less than one hour of training or instruction
on billing and 26% of the respondents noted that the firm provided no training or
instruction on billing.
88
Firm managers who do not provide training or written guidelines to associ-
ates may not affirmatively communicate firm norms to new associates, leaving
them to learn the institutional norms by observing the behavior of others. 89 As
suggested by Professor Lerman, "many associates anxious to assimilate them-
selves into an institution and to be successful within it, will watch the more expe-
rienced lawyers to see what the real standards of conduct are." 90 "If the senior
lawyers are not precise in their billing practices, the junior lawyers will not be." 91
Rather than leaving associates to discern standards and acceptable conduct, firms
should implement guidelines and training programs to encourage ethical behavior
and discourage abuses.92 These measures serve as part of the firm's ethical infra-
structure.
93
Another important aspect of the firm's ethical infrastructure is a system or
policy for dealing with ethical concerns of attorneys. 94 While a majority of re-
spondents (54%) indicated that their firms had such a system or policy, 22% said
that their firms had no such system or policy, and 24% checked the "I don't
know" box.95 Again, the number of associates who did not have knowledge of a
86 This 71% reflects 30% who "strongly agree" and 41% who "somewhat agree."
87 Fourteen percent of the respondents noted that the firm provided more than two hours of training
on billing, and 16% indicated that more than two hours of law school class time was devoted to
discussing the ethics of hourly billing.
88 This compares to 42% of the respondents who noted that no amount of law school class time was
devoted to discussing the ethics of hourly billing.
89 Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra note 5, at 681 (explaining that new associates may learn stan-
dards of conduct by watching the more experienced lawyers). Junior lawyers who are "anxious to
assimilate themselves into an institution and to be successful within it" will not be precise in their
billing practices if senior lawyers are not. Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and Lawyers'Accounts of Eth-
ics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 824 (1998) (noting that attorneys' views on
whether firms have such distinctive cultures vary depending on the positions of attorneys within
firms).
93 See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 10 (1991)
(using the term "ethical infrastructure" to refer to firm policies, procedures, and systems that con-
trol attorney conduct).
94 Eighty-three percent of firms that use written guidelines also have an ethics system or policy for
dealing with the ethical concerns of attorneys. This might suggest that firms that are conscientious
about billing matters also appreciate the importance of a general system or policy regarding ethics.
95 In a 1995 survey of all managing partners of all Texas firms with 10 or more attorneys, 73% of
the respondents indicated that their firms had an appointed a principal or committee to handle eth-
ics or malpractice problems. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Them-
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firm system suggests a lack of communication within firls. 96 Given the "natural
reluctance of attorneys to report misconduct by their peers," firm managers
should adopt some type of internal reporting policy or system as well as commu-
nicate to its associates the importance of reporting concerns. 97 By doing so, firm
leadership signals a commitment to ethical practice.98
Table 2 illustrates the types of ethics policies or systems that the respon-
dents' firms have implemented.
Table 2
Firm Size and Ethics Measures or Systems 99
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms
(11-24 (25-100 (over 100
attorneys) attorneys) attorneys)
Designated ethics counsel 15% 35% 56%
Ethics committee 8% 24% 63%
Written policy encouraging 12% 24% 33%
the reporting of misconduct
Scheduled in-firm meetings 42% 16% 18%
Scheduled ethics training 31% 42% 51%
Other means/measures 35% 24% 9%
selves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 271,
289 (1997). The difference between this 73% of firm managers responding to the 1995 survey and
the 54% of associates responding to the 1999-2000 survey may relate to a number of factors in-
cluding the lapse in time, the lack of communication with associates in firms, and the possibility
that some firm managers "overstated" the existence of a system. Compare Stephen R. Volk et al.,
Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of
Law Firms, 48 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1578 (1993) (reporting on a 1992 study of 50 law firns nation-
wide, which found that 25% of the respondents had a policy and system for dealing with ethical
concerns of lawyers).
96 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
97 Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 202-16 (discussing the value of internal reporting
mechanisms in helping overcome attorney reluctance to report others' misconduct). In particular,
junior attorneys who fear retaliation appear to be particularly reluctant to report violations. Id. at
209.
98 Legal experts recognize the role of firm managers in cultivating a moral climate within in a firm.
As stated by Professor Lerman, "standards of ethical conduct can be raised successfully only by the
leadership of the firm because higher ethical standards may reduce profits, and junior lawyers are
under intense pressure to contribute to the firm's profit margin." Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra
note 5, at 681.
99 Respondents checked all measures and systems used by their firms.
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With the exception of in-firm meetings, which are commonly conducted in
smaller firms, these percentages show a relationship between firm size and im-
plementation of formal ethics systems or policies. Larger percentages of respon-
dents from Small and Medium Firms (35% and 24%, respectively) checked
"other," possibly reflecting the tendency of smaller firms to rely on informal
monitoring.1'°
Associates may consult the firm's ethics system or policy when they en-
counter questionable billing practices by other firm attorneys. The majority of
the respondents (52%) noted that they have had concerns about the billing prac-
tices of other firm attorneys.' 01 When asked about how they handled the con-
cems, the largest percentage (61%) noted that they "discussed the matter with
another associate"; only 25% indicated that they "discussed the matter with a
supervisor or managing attorney." The associates' peers, unlike the associates'
superiors, probably possess limited experience and power to address the per-
ceived problem. Under these circumstances, consultation with other associates
appears to be more cathartic than corrective.' 02 Given the apparent reluctance of
many associates to consult their superiors and the large number of associates
(27%) who "did nothing" when they had concerns about the billing practices of
others, firm managers should not rely solely on associate feedback. Rather, su-
pervising and billing attorneys should diligently monitor billing practices and
records.
Survey results suggest that many supervising attorneys may not be ques-
tioning billing entries. Sixty-six percent of the respondents indicated that during
the last year their supervising attorneys never "questioned"' 3 their billing en-
tries.'04 Among Large Firm associates, the percentage reporting that their bill-
ings had not been questioned went up to 71%.105 Especially in firms where asso-
moo See John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm: Supervision of
Multistate Offices; Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbi-
trate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 967, 976-78 (1995) (describing the differences
between monitoring mechanisms in large and small firms).
10' In his 1991 and 1994-95 surveys, Professor Ross found "distressing indications of the extent to
which attorneys perceive that other attorneys abuse hourly billing." Ross, THE HONEST HOUR,
supra note 6, at 29. Ross' 1994-95 study revealed that approximately "one-sixth of both the inside
and outside counsel said that they believe that more than a quarter of all billable time is padded."
Id.
102 In private practice as an associate and partner, I observed the associate subculture.
103 One respondent commented that the term "questioned" was ambiguous. This term was used to
encompass all possible scrutiny from an outright challenge of a billing entry to a simple inquiry.
104 Another 32% noted that their supervising attorneys had "occasionally" questioned their billing
entries during the last year. Only 2% of the respondents indicated that their supervising attorneys
had "frequently" questioned their billing entries.
105 In all categories the results reveal a relationship between firm size and supervisors questioning
billing, with more scrutiny occurring in the smaller firms. For example, 56% of the Small Firm
respondents and 65% of the Medium Firm respondents reported that their supervisor had "never"
questioned their billings during the last year. The percentage of respondents who noted that their
supervisors had "frequently" questioned their billings was 6% in the Small Firms, 2% in the Me-
dium Finns and less than 1% in the Large Firms. This may indicate supervisors in smaller firms
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ciates face a great deal of pressure to bill, this lack of scrutiny may allow billing
abuses and questionable billing practices to go undetected.
E. Billing Practices Addressed in ABA Ethics Opinion 93-379
ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379 tackled a number of questionable
practices °6 related to the ethics of hourly billing. 0 7 After explaining that an at-
torney "who has agreed to bill on the basis of hours expended does not fulfill her
ethical duty if she bills the client for more time than she actually spends on the
client's behalf," the opinion condemns particular billing practices including
"double-billing" and "re-cycling" work. 10 8 In this context, Professor Ross de-
fines "double-billing" as billing two clients for work performed at the same
time. 109 "Re-cycled work" refers to billing "clients by the hour for work that was
created at another time for another client."" 0 In his 1991 and 1994-95 surveys
Professor Ross asked inside and outside counsel about both double billing and
billing for recycled work.
who work closely with their associates are in a better position to evaluate and question billing en-
tries.
106 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) (referring to
"problematic billing practices" that are "the subject of frequent inquiry, with the goal of helping the
profession adhere to its ethical obligations to its clients despite economic pressures") [hereinafter
ABA Opinion 93-379]. Some commentators characterize certain practices in the ABA Opinion as
"questionable" because of the differences of opinion on the ethics of the practices. E.g., Adam C.
Altman, To Bill, or Not to Bill?: Lawyers Who Wear Watches Almost Always Do, Although Ethical
Lawyers Actually Think About It First, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 214 n.81 (1998) (referring to
those who view double billing as "questionable behavior" unlike "outright fraud," which is clearly
unethical). For arguments justifying double billing under certain circumstances, see Ross, THE
HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 80-83 (introducing the discussion by noting that the ethics of dou-
ble billing "are more complex that the ABA's opinion suggests"). Compare Roy Simon, Gross
Profits? An Introduction to a Program on Legal Fees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 625, 633 (1994) (refer-
ring to a "fairly sarcastic op-ed column from sociologist Amitai Etzioni asking why lawyers needed
to be told these things at all").
107 The opinion divides the practices into two sets. The first set involves "billing more than one
client for the same hours spent," and the second relates to billing for expenses and disbursements.
ABA Opinion 93-379, supra note 106.
108 According to the opinion, a lawyer "who has agreed to bill solely on the basis of time spent is
obliged to pass the benefits of (the) economies on to the client." Id. Therefore, an attorney who
"flies for six hours for one client, while working for five hours on behalf of another, has not earned
eleven billable hours." Id. "A lawyer who is able to reuse old work product has not re-earned the
hours previously billed and compensated when the work product was first generated." In short, the
lawyer who is billing by the hour is never permitted "to charge the client for more hours than were
actually expended on the client matter." Id.
109 Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 79. For a discussion of the ethical problems with
double billing, see Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Billing, Padding
and Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 611, 617-25 (1996).
110 Id. While Professor Ross offers justifications for double billing, he emphatically states that
hourly billing for recycled work is "clearly unethical." Id. at 82-83. Cf Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms,
Technology, and the Double-Billing Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (1998) (stating that
the ethics rules do not provide guidance for determining an appropriate fee when a lawyer uses
recycled work).
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In comparing the results of the 1994-95 survey to the results of the 1991
survey, Ross noted that attitudes of outside counsel "changed markedly during
recent years." 11 He found that the number of respondents who said that they
had never engaged in double billing increased from one half in 1991 to three
quarters in 1994-95.I2 Ross found a similar pattern in the responses to the ques-
tions related to the ethics of billing for recycled work. On the 1991 survey,
12.4% of respondents believed that it was never "ethical for an attorney to bill a
client for work (e.g., research or drafting) that originally was undertaken for an-
other client and has been 're-cycled' for the second client... 3  In the 1994-95
study, that percentage increased to 65%.' 14 Ross suggests that the changes in
attitudes reflect a "growing awareness of the ethical impropriety of billing for re-
cycled work." This trend continues as indicated by the survey results discussed
in the next section.
F. Survey Results Related to Double Billing and Recycled Work
The questionnaire used in the 1999-2000 Associate Survey included some
questions similar to those used in the Ross surveys. The double billing question
asked: "During the last year, have you ever billed two clients for work performed
at the same time (e.g. billing one client for reviewing a deposition while billing
another client for travel time)?" In response to this question, 86% of the respon-
dents answered "no." On the recycled work question, 83% of the respondents
noted that they did not bill more than the revision time when revising and recy-
cling a document originally prepared for another client.
Interestingly, the percentage of the respondents who engage in the double
billing and recycled work practices goes down as firm size increases. 115 While
only 10% of the respondents in Large Firms admitted double billing, 14% in Me-
dium Firms and 24% in Small Firms admitted double billing during the last
year.1 6 A similar pattern occurred on the responses to the recycled work ques-
tion. A shocking 30% of the associates in Small Firms indicated that during the
.. Id. at 83.
112 Id. The comparison also reveals that the number of respondents who believed that double bill-
ing is never ethical increased from one-fifih in 1991 to two-thirds in 1994-95. Id. Professor Ross
attributes the change to "the widespread discussion of the ethics of double billing, which produced
a consensus that [the practice) is unethical." Id.
113 Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 39, at 93 app. A. Twenty percent of the respon-
dents believed that the practice was ethical "even if the second client is billed on the basis of time
and is not informed that the work was 're-cycled."' Id. Ross described this result as perhaps "the
most showing revelation of my 1991 survey." Id.
114 Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 267.
"' These results appear to refute the perception that the pressure on big firm attorneys to bill leads
to questionable billing practices. See ABA Opinion 93-379, supra note 106 (referring to the "com-
mon perception that pressure on lawyers to bill a minimum number of hours and on law firms to
maintain or improve profits may have led lawyers to engage in problemati billing practices").
116 A cross tabulation between the responses to the double billing question and the billable hours
requirements revealed no significant relationship. Similarly, the results indicated no significant
relationship between the responses on number of hours billed and the responses on the double-
billing questions.
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last year they had recycled work and charged the hourly client more than the re-
vision time. In Medium Firm and Large Firms, the percentage went down to
19% and 9%, respectively. These differences in percentages may relate to the
possibility that some associates in Small and Medium Firms may not have
enough work to fulfill their annual billable requirements.' 
17
Contrary to what might be expected, the results revealed that a larger per-
centage of associates in the lower income categories double bill compared to
associates in the higher income categories. While 20% of those associates who
earned $50,000 to $84,999 indicated that they double billed within the last year,
only 9% of the associates who earned more than $125,000 admitted doing so." 8
Similarly, the largest percentage of associates who charged for more than revi-
sion time occurred in the income category of between $50,000 and $84,999."9
These associates in the lower income category may actually feel more pressure to
produce than those whose income is higher.
More attention to the ethics of double billing and billing for recycled work
might reduce the number of attorneys who engage in those practices. Fifty-seven
percent of the respondents indicated that their supervising attorneys and firms
had not provided any guidance on the two practices. Slightly over half of the
respondents (51%) noted that they had not even heard of ABA Opinion 93-
379."0 Of those who had read or heard about the opinion, a smaller percentage
of them engaged in double billing, as compared to those respondents who had not
heard of the opinion. 2'
Finally, the responses related to double billing and recycled work may be
the ones in the questionnaire that were the most susceptible to self-reporting er-
rors and impression management. 22 Respondents who deny questionable prac-
tices may be engaged in "enhancement (the claiming of positive attributes), de-
117 The responses revealed no significant relationship between the responses to the question on
recycled work and to the question on the number of billable hours required.
118 Ten percent of the associates whose income was between $85,000 and $124,999 admitted that
they double billed during the last year.
119 Among those associates whose income was $50,000 to $84,999, 22% reported that they billed
for more than revision time, while 14% of those who made between $125,000 and $159,999 did so.
120 When Professor Ross asked the same question in 1994-95, 57% of the respondents indicated that
they had not heard about the then-year-old ABA Opinion 93-379. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, supra
note 6, at 267. By the 1999-2000 survey, the number of associates who at least had heard about the
opinion should have been greater if more law school professional responsibility classes and con-
tinuing legal education programs included a discussion of the ethics of hourly billing.
121 Among the respondents who admitted double billing, 7% had read ABA Opinion 93-379. The
percentage goes up to 28% for those who had heard about the opinion but had not read it. The
largest percentage of those who double billed were those who had not even heard of the opinion.
This suggests that the reading and knowledge of ABA Opinion 93-379 influenced a number of
respondents. On the other hand, a cross tabulation of the respondents who had read the ABA opin-
ion and those who billed for recycled work revealed no significant relationship.
122 The term "impression management" describes "the behavior of attempting to manipulate others'
impressions through 'the selective exposure of some information (it may be false information) ...
coupled with suppression of [other] information."' RONALD JAY COHEN & MARK E. SWERLIK,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND ASSESSMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO TESTS AND ASSESSMENT 389
(4th ed. 1999).
2000]
UMKC LA W REVIEW
nial (the repudiation of negative attributes), or self-deception (the tendency to
give favorably biased but honestly held self-descriptions)."1 23 The anonymous
nature of respondents' answers was intended to counter the desire of some re-
spondents to lie in order to provide socially acceptable answers.
124
G. Work Alternatives
During the last forty years, the demographics of law practice have changed
dramatically. In stark contrast to the past, the legal profession now includes
larger numbers of minority groups and women.125 Practicing lawyers also now
represent three different generations: Veterans (born from 1922 to 1943); Boom-
ers (born from 1943 to 1960)126; and Xers (born from 1960 to 1980).127 Genera-
tional differences as well as gender and racial/ethnic differences may impact at-
torneys' values, motivation, and goals.
Current associates had been influenced by pivotal events including corpo-
rate "down sizing."'128 Generation Xers who observed layoffs may have little
confidence that employers will "take care of them."' 129 If associates do not feel
committed to their employers, they may resent working long hours for the elusive
promise of partnership. These associates may be more concerned about non-
work priorities, preferring to work less, even if a reduced hour arrangement
means less compensation.
Some academics, commentators and legal recruiters have urged firms to of-
fer reduced compensation arrangements. 130 Associates, as well as partners, have
123 id.
124 See Beck et al., supra note 14, at 12-13 (comparing the relative advantages and disadvantages of
self-reporting questionnaires).
125 See Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the
Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1081,
1084 (1999) (referring to the change in gender composition as the "most visible" change in the
legal profession).
Compare, e.g., Marcia Pennington Shannon, Rethinking Partnership: A Generation X-er Per-
spective, LAW PRAc. MGMT., Apr. 2000, at 35 (describing the factors that influence the career deci-
sions of Generation X-ers as "belonging, learning, entrepreneurship and security").
127 See Hazel L. Johnson, Bookmarks, LAW PRAC. MGMT., May-June 2000, at 61 (reviewing RON
ZEMKE ET AL., GENERATIONS AT WORK: MANAGING THE CLASH OF VETERANS, BOOMERS, XERS,
AND NEXTERS IN YOUR WORKPLACE (2000)). Unlike their parents, who devoted their lives to "the
religion of work," Generation X-ers are "committed to more balance in their lives." RON ZEMKE ET
AL., GENERATIONS AT WORK: MANAGING THE CLASH OF VETERANS, BOOMERS, XERS, AND NEXTERS
IN YOUR WORKPLACE 99 (2000).
128 See Johnson, Bookmarks, supra note 127 (explaining that pivotal events shape each generation's
reaction to the workplace).
129 One commentator described this perspective as follows: "Many of the new generation watched
their parents fall victim to corporate downsizing, re-engineering and recession. The companies and
firms that were supposed to provide lifetime security did not. This generation holds no illusions
that they [sic] will be taken care of by their employers through good times and bad." John Lipsey,
The Lure of the Startup Forces Firms to Compete, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 2000, at B 12.
130 E.g., Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An Impossible Dream?, 21
CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 802 (1992) (referring to reduced earning expectations as the "key" to restor-
ing professionalism and quality to the practice of law); Lauren Eaton Prescott, The Verdict Is in on
the Great Pay Hike, TEX. LAW., Oct. 4, 1999, at 19 (reporting that legal recruiters "have seen no
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echoed the sentiment in study reports. As stated by one partner in an "elite firm,"
"[i]f you talk to young associates it is really extraordinary the number of them
who say.. . 'Please God let them pay me $25,000 a year less and let me work that
much less, too.' ' 131 According to the Keeping the Keepers Report, "Numerous
associates reported that they had taken substantial pay cuts in order to achieve a
more balanced lifestyle, and even those who had not yet made such a dramatic
move indicated their willingness to earn less for a chance at having a life outside
the office."' 132 Even The Rodent, a satire on associate life, reflects the view that
"free time" may be the job benefit that is "most appreciated" by associates.' 33
In an effort to evaluate actual interest in reduced work arrangements, the
1999-2000 questionnaire asked about respondents' willingness to make less to
work less. As revealed in Table 3, the respondents are evenly split between those
respondents who indicated some level of interest in reduced work/compensation
arrangements and those who indicated no such interest.
Table 3
Willingness to Make Less to Work Less
Male Female All
respondents respondents respondents
Yes, regardless of its impact on my 4% 12% 7%
treatment or advancement at the
firm
Yes, provided that it would not ad- 28% 20% 25%
versely effect my treatment or ad-
vancement at the firm
Yes, provided that it would not affect 6% 38% 18%
my treatment, even if it affects my
advancement at the firm
No, because I'm interested in maxi- 33% 16% 27%
mizing my income
No, because inevitably such an ar- 29% 14% 23%
rangement will affect my treatment
and advancement at the firm
decrease in the number of overworked associates who are eager to leave their law firm practices in
search of precious time"). But cf Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 259-60 (expressing
views that pay cuts would neither be acceptable to attorneys nor effective in lowering the work
load).
131 Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
669, 741-42 (1997) (reporting on interviews with "elite firm lawyers" conducted between 1989 and
1992).
132 KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 14.
113 The Rodent, Perks for the Overworked Attorney: Firms Give Lawyers Everything, Except Time
Away from Work, TEX. LAW., May 29, 2000, at 61.
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Possibly the most noteworthy percentage in Table 3 is the 18% of all re-
spondents who reported that they would exchange lower compensation for fewer
hours, provided that it would not affect their treatment, even if it affected their
advancement. Although these associates report that they would be comfortable
with the future "advancement" consequences of reduced work arrangements, they
did not want to be treated like second-class lawyers. These associates may have
observed differential treatment of part-time attorneys and other associates not on
the partnership track.
Those respondents who are not on the partnership track appear to be more
interested in reduced work arrangements than those on the partnership track.
Twenty-three percent of the associates not on the partnership track indicated that
they were interested in a reduced work arrangement, regardless of the impact on
treatment or advancement. Presumably, these associates, like part-time attor-
neys, have already made a decision to work less, understanding the conse-
quences. 1
34
In focusing on the number of years associates worked in their position,
those who appeared to be most interested in maximizing income were the re-
spondents employed less than twelve months. Similarly, in focusing on the num-
ber of years licensed, the respondents licensed less than three years were the most
interested in maximizing income. While many of these new attorneys may be
motivated to maximize income, their perspective may change with time and ex-
perience. As stated in the Keeping the Keepers Report, "[a]s these associates
began to experience the reality of the world of law firm work, their decision to
join private practice because of salary, status or serendipity quickly evolved into
a search for personal and professional satisfaction elsewhere."' 35
Table 3 shows that a large percentage of female respondents (38%) were
interested in reduced work arrangements, provided it did not affect their treat-
ment. 136 As indicated, 12% of the female respondents, compared to 4% of the
male respondents, were willing to take a pay cut to work less, regardless of the
impact on their treatment or advancement.
In the highest income category of associates making more than $160,000
annually, 20% of the respondents indicated that they were interested in working
less, to make less, "regardless of its impact on my treatment or advancement at
the firm." These associates fit the description of high-paid associates who now
value more time above more money. As stated by a respected legal recruiter,
"[tihe firm that realizes that what associates want is not more disposable income
134 Fifty-eight percent of the part-time. attorneys reported that they would take a pay cut to work
less.
135 KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 22.
136 Only 6% of the male respondents reported that they would be willing to take a pay decrease
provided that it would not affect their treatment, even if it affected their advancement.
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- but more time to spend and enjoy the income they already have - is the firm
that will retain its associates today and in the future." 1
37
Firms that seek to recruit and retain associates should also offer associates
alternative work schedules. Among the survey respondents, 55% indicated that
their firms did allow alternative work arrangements, and 25% reported that their
firms did not.138  Alternative arrangements, such as flex-time and part-time
schedules, help associates accommodate their family and other non-work com-
mitments.
For many of the respondents, non-work priorities have influenced their
choice of employment. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents indicated that
non-work priorities had "a great deal" of influence on their choice of employ-
ment. Another 42% reported that non-work priorities "somewhat" influenced
their choice of employment. Associates whose non-work priorities have influ-
enced their employment choice may feel some of the damaging effects of the
hours derby more than other associates.
III. EFFECTS OF BILLABLE HOUR EXPECTATIONS
Commentators and practitioners both rail at the steady escalation in billable
hour requirements. 139 While hourly billing should not be considered "the root of
all evil,"' 4 the serious consequences of an hours derby demand examination.
Some of the effects of firms increasing billable hour requirements, such as the
time famine, are obvious. Others are more insidious in damaging individual at-
torneys, as wells as their clients, firms, the legal profession and the general pub-
lic.
A. Time Famine and Partnership Aspirations
From an associate's perspective, increasing hourly requirements can create
an oppressive work environment. As described by one associate who was push-
ing to exceed a billable hours requirement of 1800, "I felt like Pigpen," referring
to the Peanuts cartoon character that continuously had a cloud of dirt over his
head. 141 "But my cloud was billable hours. No matter what I did, I felt like I
should be in the office doing work, not doing specific client work but racking up
hours." 1
42
137 Larry Prescott, Time May Be Money, But Money Is Not Time, TEX. LAW., Oct. 19, 1998, at 22.
Furthermore, those "firms that seriously put a premium on the value of life outside the firm will not
only retain their associates, but will be able to recruit associates from other firms as well." Id.
138 The remaining 20% noted that they "did not know" about alternative work arrangements. This
might mean that no alternatives are currently available or that a lack of communication exists
within the firm.
139 "Most law firm managers contacted agreed that increasing hours and the resulting time pressures
posed a serious problem to the profession but considered their own expectations to be reasonable
ones." Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 65.
14 0 Lawrence J. Fox, Money Didn't Buy Happiness, 100 DICK. L. REv. 531, 532 (1996) (referring to
the complexity of the problems facing the legal profession).
141 Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay?, supra note 139, at 62.
142 id.
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During the last twenty years, the pressure to work longer hours created a
kind of "time famine" for attorneys in that they do not have enough time for
themselves and their families. 143 The ABA Young Lawyers study revealed that
the number of attorneys who experienced a time famine increased by 33% be-
tween 1984 and 1990.144 The time famine problem and other problems identified
in the Young Lawyers study were discussed at an ABA Conference on the sub-
ject. 45 One participant stated: "They have to turn their lives over to the firm.' 46
Another participant captured the time commitment by stating that lawyers "are
asked not to dedicate but to sacrifice their life to the firm.", 14 Because of the
time commitment and other work pressures, many attorneys find it difficult to
achieve a healthy balance between their work and personal lives. As explained
by Professor Schiltz, working sixty, seventy, or even eighty hours a week to pro-
duce 2000 hours per year "leaves room for little else in the attorney's life." 148 As
a result, those things that give most people "joy and meaning - family, friends,
hobbies, the arts, recreations, exercise - are absent from [the attorney's] life."' 149
While the general labor population also struggles with the growing demands to
balance work and personal life, the intense time pressures inherent to the legal
profession magnify the problem for many attorneys.
150
143 In the 1990's, American Bar Association reports began using the term "time famine." See, e.g.,
STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 6, and BREAKING POINT
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3 (considering the factors that have contributed to the "de-
terioration in the lawyer workplace").
144 ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 23 (1990) [hereinafter
STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT] (noting that this increase closely corresponded to the
43% increase in the number of lawyers in the 1990 survey who reported working 200 or more
hours a month). This study also will also be referred to as the 1990 YLD study.
145 BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2. Conference participants who were
primarily managing or upper management partners from firms of all sizes discussed the demands
on lawyers' time.
'46 Id. at 3.
147 Id. A respondent in a Seventh Circuit survey expressed similar frustration in stating, "In my
firm. . . the emphasis on billable hours and bottom line leaves little time or inclination for passing
on a sense of proportion of balance in life of law." LaMothe, supra note 41, at 2.
'4' Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the
Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 725-26 (1998).
149 Id. at 726. "You can't really address the issue of quality of life without addressing the issue of
hours." Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay?, supra note 139, at 64 (quoting Ronald L. Hirsch, a
director of the ABA Young Lawyers Division). "You can make the firm a better place to work.
But once you go beyond a certain number of hours, over a period of years, with no time for your-
self or your family, your quality of life is still bad." Id.
150 McKim, supra note 46, at 167. "Continual clashes between work and family amount to the
lawyer living in a constant state of conflict." Id. at 175. Even when attorneys are not working,
they may feel pressured to attend firm social activities and to informally socialize with co-workers.
See Hope Viner Sambom, Plays Well With Others, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 78 (emphasizing the
importance of attorneys maintaining balance when faced with work and "homefront" commit-
ments). The publication and popularity of the following recent books suggests that many attorneys
are seeking "balance": GEORGE W. KAUFMAN, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO BALANCING LIFE AND
WORK (1999); STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE
LEGAL LIFE (1999).
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The experience of Alice Hector, a Miami litigator, dramatically illustrates
the personal price of working long hours. In 1998, a Florida state appeals court
denied Hector primary custody of her children because of her workload.'151 Ironi-
cally, the child custody battle led Hector to leave her position at an elite law firm
to open her own "family-friendly firm."'
152
Although no respondent indicated that they lost a custody fight because of
long hours, the majority of respondents (66%) reported that billable hour pressure
had "taken a toll" on their personal lives. The percentages reporting that billable
hour pressure had taken a toll also increased as billable hour requirements in-
creased.'53 Predictably, a cross tabulation showed a relationship between the
number of hours worked and the percentage of respondents who indicated that
billable hours pressure had taken such a toll. The percentage answering in the
affirmative increased as the number of hours worked increased.
54
Similarly, the results revealed that the percentage of those reporting that
billable hour pressure had taken a toll increases with firm size. 55 Among re-
spondents in the Large Firms, 74% indicated that billable hours pressure had
indeed taken a toll on their personal life. 56
In focusing on marital status, the largest percentage was reported by the
single/widowed respondents. 157 Evidently, many single/widowed respondents
without a "marriage family" may be working longer hours, finding it difficult to
maintain a balance between their work and personal lives.
158
When asked to describe how billable hours pressure had taken a toll on the
respondent's personal life, 95% of those responding checked the box that stated:
"I have less time for my friends and family."' 59 Twenty-five percent checked the
151 Jim Oliphant & Anna Snider, This Time, Hard Work Hurt, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at A4.
152 Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Alice Hector's Family-Friendly Firm, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, 1999, at
A14.
153 Of the 11 respondents whose billable hour expectation was 2400 hours or more a year, 83%
ruorted that billable hour pressure had taken a toll on their personal lives.
Seventy-three percent of those working 2880 hours a year answered "yes," compared to 63% of
those working 1920-2399 hours a year.
155 Considering the respondents' income, the largest percentage of respondents who indicated that
billable hours had taken a toll were respondents making more than $160,000 a year. Of the six
respondents who reported making more than $160,000, 83% indicated that billable hour pressure
had taken a toll on their personal lives. At the opposite end of the continuum, the smaller percent-
age of respondents who reported that billable hour pressure had taken a toll were respondents
making less than $50,000 a year. A statistical analysis of these responses found that the relation-
ship was not statistically significant.
156 Of those respondents working in Medium Firms, 59% reported that billable hour pressure had
taken a toll on their personal lives. That percentage went down to 56% in Small Firms.
157 Among the single/widowed respondents, 79% reported that billable hours pressure had taken a
toll on their personal lives. Interesting, only 46% of the divorced/separated respondents admitted to
such a toll.
158 In response to the question that asked respondents to indicate how billable hour pressure had
taken a toll, one respondent checked, "other" and stated "never have married; have no children."
159 In answering to the question, "Which of the following describes how billable hours pressure has
taken a toll on your life?," the respondents were asked to check all that applied. Because respon-
dents could check more than one box, the percentages exceed 100%.
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box that stated: "I have more trouble sustaining an intimate relationship than I
used to.' 160 Another 20% checked "other," describing the way in which billable
hours pressure had taken a toll on their personal lives.
When it comes to firm efforts to assist associates in balancing their work
and personal lives, the study results present a good news-bad news picture. The
good news is that some firms have made efforts to assist attorneys in attaining
balance. Eight percent of the respondents rated their firms' efforts as "excellent,"
and another 33% rated the efforts as "good." The bad news is that 16% of the
respondents rated their firms' efforts as "poor," and 11% indicated that their
firms' efforts were "nonexistent."
The majority of the respondents appear to believe that the price for attain-
ing partnership status may be fulfillment outside of work. Seventy-one percent
of the respondents indicated that they agreed with the statement: "I must sacrifice
fulfillment outside of work in order to attain partnership status." 161
These results suggest that a large percentage of respondents recognize that
making partner requires more of a time commitment than is necessary for associ-
ates. 162 One participant in the Keeping the Keepers study described the dilemma:
"It's like a pie-eating contest where the first prize is all the pie you can eat."
163
Believing that law practice only gets harder in terms of commitment, hours and
pressure, 164 some associates may not even aspire to win the partnership trophy.
165
Among the survey respondents, only 8% identified "full partner participation" as
the professional goal they were most interested in attaining. 166 One survey re-
spondent expressed disillusionment in becoming a partner: "I do not see myself
as a partner, and sincerely hope to be out of the profession before I am consid-
ered for partner." Those associates who do not aspire to be members of the part-
160 Cf Klein, supra note 12, at Al (stating that 42.6% of the partners responding to a National Law
Journal survey reported that their jobs had hurt their relationships with significant others).
161 Thirty-three percent indicated that they "strongly agree" with the statement, and 37% noted that
they "somewhat agree." Another 13% reported that they "somewhat disagree" with the statement.
Only 6% "strongly disagree" with the statement.
162 A primer on becoming a pdrtner described the pressure as follows: "This new job will push you
and pull you like never before. You will be stretched thin at times between clients and between
billable and nonbillable tasks." Van Beckwith, Welcome to Partner-Dome - Now Get to Work,
TEx. LAW., Jan. 31, 2000, at 42.
163 KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 106.
164 Id. (discussing the anecdotal information and feedback obtained from focus group participants
from four major metropolitan centers).
165 As stated in the Keeping the Keepers Report, "the traditional private practice incentive of de-
ferred responsibility and ultimately partnership no longer operate to keep [associates] striving for
what the future holds." Id. at 38. For a critique of the promotion-to-partnership tournament theory,
see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1581 (1998). In describing the differences between the economic tournament model and the
actual practices of elite law firms, Wilkins and Gulati note that many associates do not compete in
the tournament, and "firms do not give every associate an equal chance of winning." Id. at 1586-
87.
166 The largest percentage of respondents (35%) described "rewarding work" as the goal they were
most interested in attaining.
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nership club may feel particularly dissatisfied about paying dues and making
personal sacrifices.
167
B. Dissatisfaction
The ABA Young Lawyers Division (YLD) study identified increases in
hours worked and the resulting decrease in personal time as a major cause of
attorney dissatisfaction. 168 Comparing the data from 1984 and 1990, the YLD
study found that the time for self and family became an important factor affecting
overall job satisfaction. 169 Although the majority of the respondents in the YLD
surveys reported that they were satisfied, by 1990 the number of lawyers who
indicated that they were satisfied had decreased, accompanied by an increase in
dissatisfaction. 170
Ten years later, the levels of satisfaction found in my 1999-2000 Associate
Survey are very similar to those reported in the 1990 study.171 In the Associate
Survey, 32% of the respondents reported that they were "very satisfied," and
47% noted that they were "somewhat satisfied." 172 When asked to describe the
morale among associates at their firms, 10% of the respondents indicated that
morale was "excellent," and 43% indicated that morale was "good." 
173
167 One respondent expressed the opposite view, explaining that his/her dissatisfaction related to the
"firm's lack of a partnership track or even an incentive-based compensation system."168 Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the Large
Law Firm, 31 GoNz. L. REv. 373, 398 (1995-96). "The increased pressure to work and decreased
time for personal life reported by many lawyers mirrors a far-reaching change in American life."169 STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT, supra note 144, at 58. In both the 1984 and 1990
surveys, the largest number of respondents identified "intellectual challenge" as the most important
factor in determining job satisfaction. By 1990, "time for self/family" became the second most
important factor behind intellectual challenge. Holmes, supra note 168, at 398. As revealed in the
1999-2000 survey, family and non-work priorities continue to play an important role in associates'
employment decisions. In response to the question, "How much have family and/or non-work
priorities influenced your choice of employment?," thirty-eight percent of the respondents checked
"a great deal," 42% checked "somewhat" and 21% checked "none or very little."
170 STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT, supra note 144, at 52 (reporting a 20% reduction in
the number of lawyers indicating that they were very satisfied).
7 In the 1990 YLD survey, 33% of the respondents indicated that they were "very satisfied," and
43% indicated that they were "somewhat satisfied." STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT,
supra note 144, at 52. Compare Lori Cook & Cynthia L. Spanhel, Job Satisfaction in the Texas
Legal Profession, TEX. B.J., June 1991, at 592 (reporting that 76% of the lawyers responding in a
1990 survey were "satisfied with their current jobs").
172 In response the question, "Overall, how satisfied are you with your current job?," 16% indicated
"somewhat dissatisfied," and 5% marked "very dissatisfied."
173 Thirty-three percent of the respondents noted that morale among the associates at their firms
was "average," 13% rated morale as "poor," and 1% rated morale as "very poor." Commentators
attribute low morale to a number of causes including lack of understanding of the demands of law
practice. See, e.g., Chic Born, The Last Word: A Declaration on Morale, RES GESTAE, Jan. 1996,
at 50 (referring to morale problems related to lawyers not knowing "what they had gotten into when
they went to law school," not realizing the time demands and pressure of law practice, not under-
standing that the time demands would affect their personal relationships, and not comprehending
that "politics" played an important role in practice development).
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These results appear to conflict with the continuing widespread reports and
anecdotal information on widespread associate dissatisfaction and low morale.
174
From a psychological standpoint, individual respondents may be engaging in a
form of denial if they are indeed dissatisfied with their work but refuse to admit it
to themselves or others. 175 In that event, the survey responses may not accurately
reflect those satisfaction levels. Another possibility is that reports of associate
dissatisfaction are exaggerated. As illustrated by the popularity of the various
"Greedy Associates" web sites, 176 many associates relish the opportunity to com-
plain about their work conditions. Still, the most obvious explanation for the
reported high levels of satisfaction relates to the high salaries that large firm as-
sociates are currently receiving. A commentary on a 1999 Associate Quality of
Life survey captured this impact of recent salary increases in stating that the
"overall exuberance of the associates ... shows how far a few thousand dollars
goes.' 77 In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, no respondent making $125,000 or
more checked that he or she was "very dissatisfied."
While high salaries may improve reported satisfaction levels of those attor-
neys who receive high salaries, 178 the reports of high salaries may actually
deepen the frustration of other associates who are earning lower salaries. In the
Associate Survey, the largest percentage of associates who reported that they
were "very dissatisfied" were those respondents making less than $50,000.179
In analyzing the validity of the satisfaction/dissatisfaction responses, re-
sponses to other questions should be considered. Specifically, questions asking
about interest in changing jobs and careers shed light on the relative satisfaction
of the respondents. In response to the question, "Are you interested in changing
employers during the next two years?", 39% of the respondents checked "yes."
Of those respondents who answered "yes," 22% indicated that they were inter-
ested in a "non-legal job." Similarly, 26% of the respondents note that they
"strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" with the statement, "I wish that I had se-
lected a profession other than the law."' 80 These results suggest that a percentage
174 The results also do not show a statistically significant relationship between hours billed and job
satisfaction or between hours worked and job satisfaction.
175 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
176 "Greedy Associates" is a popular web site where attorneys post information related to compen-
sation, firm politics and other matters affecting the life and work of associates. For a commentary
on the explosion of this site, see Michael D. Goldhaber, Greedy Movement Comes of Age, NAT'L
L.J., May 10, 1999, at A20. Traffic on the web site suggests that associates appreciate the opportu-
nity to complain.
177 Angela Ward, The Money Talks, Large Quantities of Cash Improve Associates Quality of Life,
TEX. LAW., Oct. 4, 1999, at 3 (comparing the 1997 Quality of Life Survey results to the 1999 Qual-
it of Life Survey results).
178 Id.
179 Although the percentage of respondents who indicated that they were "very dissatisfied" in-
creased as income decreased, the relationship between income and satisfaction was not statistically
sinificant.
This percentage breaks down to 8% who "strongly agree" with the statement and 18% who
"somewhat agree" with the statement. In a study conducted by the North Carolina Bar Association
Quality of Life Task Force, 23% of the respondents indicated that they would not become attorneys
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of those respondents reporting some level of satisfaction with their current firm
would nonetheless like to change positions, or even careers. 181
C. Stress and Distress
The mere mention of billable hours to a firm associate might cause the at-
torney's blood pressure to rise. This image helps capture how billing pressure
causes stress for many attorneys. In this context, "stress" refers to "the experi-
ence in which physical or psychological demands trigger bodily or mental ten-
sion or reactions that disrupt a person's psychological or physiological equilib-
rium.,, 182 Lawyers, like the general population, must cope with common envi-
ronmental stressors including financial concerns, work overload and compe-
tition. In addition to common environmental stressors, which may be intensi-
fied for attorneys, some stressors relate more specifically to private practice. 184
"While stress is certainly a pervasive problem within the legal profession, it may
be the most acute in the law firm setting because of the emphasis on maximizing
billable hours" in those firms that use hourly billings. 85 Constantly working at a
killing pace has a cumulative effect. 186 As described in the 1990 YLD study,
"[p]eople can handle time deprivation for a year or two, but as the years go on
and there is no relief, the impact on an individual's psyche increases."' 87 The
failure of attorneys to take vacations only serves to compound the problem, espe-
if they could make the decision again. NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE QUALITY OF
LIFE TASK FORCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (1991) [hereinafter North Carolina Task Force Re-
port].181 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
182 Leslie I. Messelman, Maintaining Balance: Stress Management for Lawyers, COLO. LAW., Feb.
1996, at 13. "Few lawyers today would deny experiencing some level of stress." Id.
183 Id. at 14. "Lawyers, like everyone else, need the love and support of family and friends, time
for recreation and relaxation, spiritual comfort and the other elements of health and happy life. To
the extent the forces of modem life have undermined these elements - serving up instead family
break-down, excruciating time and financial pressures, and other toxins to happiness - lawyers
have suffered their ill effects along with everyone else." Carl Horn, Restoring the Foundations: 12
Steps Toward Personal Fulfillment in the Practice of Law, S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 32, 35.
But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Commentary: Policy Implications, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 79, 80
(1995-96) (expressing reservations about findings of a study on lawyer stress which compares
attorneys to the general population).
184 For example, the adversary nature of the legal system and the conflict between the role as zeal-
ous advocate and officer of the court are unique to law practice. Messelman, supra note 182, at 14
(listing environmental stressors related more specifically to law practice).
185 Alfini & Van Vooren, supra note 11, at 62 (noting that increasing cash flow and closing files
created stress in firms that depend on contingency fees).
186 A managing partner of Bracewell & Patterson described the cumulative effect: "I think that the
two, three, and four and five-year constancy of 2,500, 2,600 hours is a killer for individuals and
also for their families." Money Talks: In Order to Compete for Associates, Texas Firms Can't Be
Cheap, TEx. LAW., Apr. 3, 2000, at 15, 20.
187 STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT, supra note 144, at 23-24 (noting that various factors
including technology and incivility have "changed the nature of hours worked," making law prac-
tice far more stressful than in the 1960s).
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cially when considering the level of pressure and stress that lawyers are under
and their need for time off from work. 188
Unrelieved stress causes various physical and mental health problems.
Generally speaking, stress weakens the immune system, making a person more
susceptible to illness.'8 9 Stress contributes to heart disease, migraine headaches
and colitis.' 90 More common physical symptoms of unrelieved stress include
nervousness, chest pains, diarrhea and fatigue. 191 From the standpoint of mental
health, unrelieved stress can cause anxiety, inability to concentrate, shortened
attention span, difficulty focusing on tasks, avoidance and "burnout."' 9 2 More
serious effects include depression, anger, exhaustion and chronic fatigue. 193
Various studies have focused on the effects of stress on attorneys. A Uni-
versity of California at Davis School of Medicine study of female law graduates
found that those who worked more than forty-five hours a week were three times
more likely to have a miscarriage than those who worked less than thirty-five
hours. 194 Studies also suggest that attorneys may be at a greater risk for suicide
when compared to the general population. 195 In studying psychological distress
188 Id. (referring to the "small amount of vacation time actually taken by lawyers").
189 Arline Kaplan, Implications of Stress, Psychosocial Factors on the Immune System, PsY-
CHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 1999, at http://www.mhsource.com/pt/p991059.html (visited Nov. 21, 2000)
(reporting on studies dealing with the interactions between the nervous and immune systems).
190 Alfini & Van Vooren, supra note 11, at 65 (quoting Joan Myerson Shrager, The Bottom Line on
Lawyer Stress, 13 LEGAL ECON. 22 (1987)). Stress also is linked to chronic hypertension, cancer,
stroke, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, tuberculosis, influenza, and pneumonia. Beck et al., supra note
14, at 9 n.5 (citing Stephen R. Dager et al., Stress, Anxiety and the Cardiovascular System, in 2
HANDBOOK OF ANXIETY: CLASSIFICATION, ETIOLOGICAL FACTORS AND ASSOCIATED DISTURBANCE
399 (R. Noyes, Jr. et al. eds., 1988)).
191 Christopher T. Borgeson & Elizabeth M. Link, Stress Management: Minimizing the Risk of
Malpractice - Is Stress Affecting Your Competency?, 2 No. 3 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 11, 12
(1991).
192 Id. at 12. Following a study conducted by the North Carolina Bar Association Quality of Life
Task Force, supra note 180, the president of the North Carolina Bar noted that "lawyer burnout"
continues to be "a pervasive malady afflicting our profession." Horn, supra note 183, at 32 (quot-
ing the president of the North Carolina Bar). One health professional that works with law firms
explains that "burnout" results from unrelieved stress that leads to the death of the human spirit.
Borgeson & Link, supra note 191, at 12 (quoting Regina Phelps of Health Plus, an organization
that provides professional health and safety training).
193 Messelman, supra note 182, at 14 (referring to signs or symptoms of stress). Some commenta-
tors use the term "distress" to refer to some unhealthy types of stress characterized by "negative
emotions" and "physical symptoms of fatigue, headaches, upset stomachs, sleep problems, and
racing heart." Lawyers and Stress: Seeking a Balance, TRIAL, Feb. 2000, at 70.
194 Laura Gatland, Dangerous Dedication, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 28. "Nearly half of the women
lawyers surveyed said they feel high stress. Of the women who worked 45 hours or more a week,
63 percent indicated they were tense much, most or all of the time." Id.
195 A 1992 study conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found that
occupations carrying a in increased suicide risk included lawyer, health care worker, psychologist,
police officer and farmer. Id. at 28-29. The study also suggested "that the suicide rate for white
male lawyers may be over twice that of other white males, although problems with the data made a
firm conclusion impossible." Schiltz, supra note 14, at 880 (citing the unpublished paper presented
at the American Psychological Association - National Institute for Occupations Safety and Health
Conference on Workplace Stress in the 90's). The suicide of a second-year associate at the Wall
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and alcohol problems among members of the legal profession, researchers ana-
lyzed variables such as perceived stress. 196 Based on their findings, the research-
ers reached the following conclusion:
Lawyers are working more, reducing vacation time, spending less time
with family members, are prone to alcohol abuse, and face high levels
of psychological distress. The combination of elements suggests an
impending crisis for lawyers' family lives. Although the data are not
sufficient to suggest that psychological distress has detrimentally af-
fected the lawyers' ability to practice competently, the warning signs
are present. Further empirical study may well reveal that lawyer dis-
tress is having an adverse effect on the ability to practice competently
and ethically.'
Data obtained in the 1999-2000 Associate Survey indicate that unrelieved
stress associated with working long hours has negatively impacted the mental
and physical well being of many survey respondents. As stated above, 66% of
the respondents reported that billable hour pressure had taken a toll on their per-
sonal lives. When asked to describe how billable hours pressure had taken "a toll
on your personal life," 18% of the respondents checked, "I get sick more often
than before I worked for the firm," and another 20% checked "other" with many
describing the way in which billable hours had taken a toll.
Many of the descriptions generally portray associates whose lives are con-
sumed with work and who worry about billable work. 198 The largest number of
the descriptions related to the lack of balance in the respondent's life such as no
time for exercise, vacations, hobbies, personal interests or their non-work en-
Street firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton led to a wrongful death suit against the firm. In
the lawsuit, which was eventually dismissed, the associate's father alleged that the firm "gave his
son too much work, set unrealistic deadlines and assigned the son tasks beyond his capabilities."
Mark Hansen, Suicide Suit Dismissed, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 25. The court dismissed the claim
because the allegations did not describe conduct that was "sufficiently outrageous" to support a
claim of emotional distress in the workplace. Id.
196 Beck et al., supra note 14, at 1, 3 (utilizing data generated from a 1990 survey of practicing
attorneys in Washington state and a study of law students and practicing attorneys in Arizona).
197 Id. at 1. For a summary of the study's key findings on personality disorders and excessive alco-
hol use among lawyers, see Hazard, supra note 183, at 79-80. In another commentary on the study,
commentator Peter G. Glenn cautioned readers about the limitations of relying on self-reported
data, "especially... when the subjects making the reports are lawyers and law students who have
been told repeatedly that they ought to be distressed, and for whom a part of their occupational
culture is the idea that one cannot be much of a law student or lawyer unless one is working very
hard, under considerable time pressure, and in circumstances in which the risk of failure if reasona-
bly high." Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing Constructive Approaches to Lawyer
and Law Student Distress, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 69 (1995-96).
198 E.g., "I have little to no time to pursue community, intellectual, social or other interests - I just
bill." "The pressure to bill is always on my mind, even on weekends and other days off." "Billable
hours are a constant source of preoccupation and concern - you're stressed when you're billing too
much and you're stressed when you're not billing enough." "After I get home, there's only enough
time to eat and go to bed. It's depressing and unhealthy."
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deavors. 199 As tersely stated by one respondent, "I don't have time to take care
of myself (go to the gym, sleep, eat healthy, etc)." The second largest number of
descriptions referred to feelings of stress, anxiety and unhappiness. The follow-
ing respondent's description illustrates the connection between psychological and
physical distress: "Much more stress and anxiety in trying to handle all responsi-
bilities, guilt when I feel I'm not doing it all well, more migraine headaches."
Nine respondents commented on worries associated with billable hour
pressure.2°°  Beyond anxiety and stress, five respondents referred to
depression.2 °1
Only one respondent referred to alcohol consumption in describing the way
in which billable hours pressure had taken a toll on his/her personal life.202 Al-
though respondents may be reluctant to admit substance abuse problems,20 3 an-
swers to the question on alcohol consumption indicate a lower level of drinking
than reported in other studies. 2 4 In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, 2% of the
respondents noted that they consume three to five drinks a day, and 6% reported
that they consume one to two drinks a day.20 5 The recent efforts of lawyer assis-
tance programs to educate law students and practicing lawyers,2 °6 as well as re-
199 As described by one respondent, "I have much less time to pursue non-work endeavors, and I
always have the pressure of billing hours, even on the weekends and during holidays and vaca-
tions."
200 E.g., "I constantly worry about attaining my hours." "I constantly think about billable hours and
talk about it with my wife, causing great stress and hurting our relationship." The lack of work to
satisfy the billable hour requirements also creates stress. One respondent referred to such stress in
stating that he or she was constantly "worrying about attaining the required amount of hours and
having the workload to accomplish it."
201 Three respondents simply noted "depression" in response to the question, which asked for a
description of how billable hours pressure had taken a toll on their personal lives. A more lengthy
description was "depression, anger, frustration with job and. co-workers that influences my attitude
often outside of work."
202 One respondent stated, "I am tired and distracted. I exercise less. I probably drink more."
203 As explained in the 1990 YLD study, "problem drinking (as well as other compulsive or addic-
tive and socially unaccepted behavior) is traditionally seriously under reported in surveys." STATE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT, supra note 144, at 50.
204 For a summary of study findings on lawyer alcohol consumption, see Schiltz, supra note 14, at
876-77. "One researcher conservatively estimated that 15% of lawyers are alcoholics." Id. at 876
(citing Eric Drogan, Alcoholism in the Legal Profession: Psychological and Legal Perspectives and
Interventions, 15 LAW& PSYCH. REv. 117, 127 (1991)).
205 In the 1990 YLD study, 6% indicated that they consumed three to five drinks a day, and 16%
indicated that the consumed one to two drinks a day. STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT,
supra note 144, at 50.
For example, representatives from the Kansas Lawyers Assistance Program speak to law school
classes once a year. Grace Wilson, Confidentiality Key to LAPC Mission, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Nov.
1998, at 4, 6. For years, attorneys with the Texas Lawyers Assistance Program (TLAP) have made
presentations at law schools and bar meetings. According to Ann Foster, Director of TLAP, law
students and new lawyers appear to be particularly interested in discussing substance abuse issues
and understanding the connection between stress and alcohol consumption. Interview with Ann
Foster, Director of the Texas Lawyers Assistance Program (Aug. 15, 2000).
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gional differences, 207 may account for the lower levels of alcohol consumption
revealed in the 1999-2000 Associate Survey.
Fifteen percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, "I
feel stressed and fatigued most of the time." Another 36% noted that they
"somewhat agree" with the statement.20 8 For the reasons discussed on the fol-
lowing section, this alarming rate of stress and fatigue can negatively affect the
quality of work performed by the associates working long hours.
D. Impact on the Quality of Work
In addition to taking a toll on associates' quality of life and health, working
long hours can also hurt the quality of work performed.209 The quality of legal
service suffers when stress results "in an inability to concentrate, shortened at-
tention span, difficulty in focusing on tasks [at hand] and avoidance. 2 0 Ac-
cording to Isaiah Zimmerman, a Washington D.C. psychologist who specializes
in counseling lawyers and judges, the "causal link between high levels of stress
and lowered performance is well documented .... ,,211 "It is reasonably safe to
conclude that lawyers who have a poor response to stress, who fail to address the
cause of their stress, will lower their level of performance and thus greatly in-
crease the risk of committing error.' '212  Thus, long work hours and stress in-
crease the likelihood of professional malpractice and discipline,213 especially in
207 In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, 14% of the respondents indicated that they did not drink
alcohol, compared to 13% in the 1990 YLD study. STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REPORT, supra
note 144, at 50. The percentage of nondrinkers might have been larger if religious attitudes in
Texas accounted for the differences in alcohol consumption.
208 This majority of respondents, who appeared to be suffering from unrelieved stress and fatigue,
fit the image that Professor Thomas Shaffer's described when he stated: "I have never met [a young
lawyer in a big firm] who did not seem tired." Schiltz, supra note 14, at 728.
209 See Maute, supra note 130, at 800. "While the first negative impact [of long work hours] may
be on the personal side, if unresolved, it will eventually spill over to impair the lawyer's capacity to
function effectively."
210 Borgeson & Link, supra note 191, at 12.
211 Id. Data from empirical studies of hospital interns and residents during their training revealed a
higher frequency of judgment errors when they worked 70 to 80 hours a week. Maute, supra note
130, at 814. "Fatigue impaired response time and the capacity to make clear, sound professional
judgments." Id. See also BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 10 (referring to
"ample evidence from qualitative studies of business executives, as well as quantitative studies in
industrial environments, that [job] distress does cause performance problems").
212 Borgeson & Link, supra note 190, at 12. "While many modem law firms spend large sums of
money on continuing legal education to maintain the highest caliber of legal representation, these
same firms may be creating an atmosphere which actually increases the likelihood of professional
negligence." Alfini & Van Vooren, supra note 11, at 66.
213 In one such disciplinary case, the Supreme Court of Oregon attributed the respondent-attomey's
misconduct to "emotional difficulties." In re Conduct of Loew, 642 P.2d 1171, 1173-74 n.2 (Or.
1982). The respondent's psychiatrist testified that the respondent suffered from "burnt out syn-
drome," explaining the condition as follows:
A number of things occur when somebody has reached this so call bum out
point. They feel fatigue all the time, they have difficulty sleeping, they feel
drained, may have an array of physical ailments which occur which are quite
real, maybe hospitalized as you were, have memory lapses, impaired concen-
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work environments in which junior attorneys' work is not properly supervised
because senior attorneys are scrambling to clock their own billable hours.?1
4
Short of professional misconduct, long work hours may undermine an at-
torney's ability to provide the quality of service that clients deserve.1 5 As stated
by Professor Judith L. Maute, "lawyers who work in excess of sixty hours a week
on a long-term basis may be physically present, but their minds cannot operate at
peak efficiency. They cannot produce good value for each hour of billable
time. 216 Because effective lawyering requires mental sharpness, critical think-
ing and possibly creativity, long work hours can prevent clients from getting high
quality legal service.217
The majority of the respondents in the Associate Survey recognize that long
work hours hurt critical and creative thinking. Twenty-two percent of the re-
spondents noted that they "strongly agree" with the statement, "Working long
hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and creatively., 218 Another
42% indicated that they "somewhat agree" with the statement.219 Those associ-
ates who take pride in doing quality work may feel particularly frustrated if they
tration, frequently miss deadlines, backlog of work, financial problems, begin
to view patients or clients or whatever people you're working with, or you be-
gin to view your work as the enemy and "Oh, my God, here comes another pa-
tient, another client," and so on. Rather than someone who is a team member,
it's an opponent.
Id.
214 For a discussion of how billable hours pressure leads to the decline of mentoring and supervi-
sion, see supra notes 253-71, and accompanying text.
215 As explained by commentator Michael H. Trotter:
The pressure to record billable hours reduces the value received by clients for
their money. More time is billed for less value added by padding (whether in-
tended or not), or by overworking files, or by tired legal minds struggling to
turn out one more memo long after they should have called it a day.
Michael H. Trotter, Law Practice Satisfaction: A Modest Proposal, 2 GA. J. S. LEGAL HIST. 253,
259 (1993).
216 Maute, supra note 130, at 814 (explaining that "fatigue impairs one's capacity to make fully
reasoned and sound professional judgments"). In reviewing attorneys' fees, "courts have refused to
believe that an attorney could perform legitimately billable tasks for periods of time that would
seem to require nearly preternatural powers of concentration and stamina." Ross, The Ethics of
Hourly Billing, supra note 39, at 13 (referring to federal cases in which the courts expressed disbe-
lief that attorneys have actually expended the "doughty" numbers of hours recorded).
217 Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard recognized the detrimental effect of long hours when he stated
that "[n]o group can get serious mental work out of its members at a rate of more than 2,000
[hours] per year across the board." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 19-
20. Compare Maute, supra note 130, at 814 (stating that "fatigue impairs one's capacity to make
fully reasoned and sound professional judgments").
218 William G. Ross asserts that excessive emphasis in generating hours discourages "the creativity
and imagination which enable attorneys to transcend plodding mediocrity and which furnish the
well-springs of legal development." Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 39, at 80.
219 Of the remaining respondents, 12% indicated that they "neither agree nor disagree," 17% indi-
cated that they "somewhat disagree," and 6% "strongly disagree."
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know that they must work long hours to succeed at the firm, and that those long
hours negatively affect their ability to think critically and creatively. 220
Associates who believe that quality should be recognized become disillu-
sioned when firm managers dwell on hours billed with little or no attention to the
quality of work. As stated by one survey respondent, "When I started with the
firm I was told hours weren't that important. Since I started, the only thing I ever
hear about is how associates need to bill 2000 a year. No one has ever said 'we
want quality."' The following section considers the quantification of private law
practice as a negative consequence of emphasizing billable hour production.
E. The Quantification of Private Law Practice, Personnel Claims,
Inefficiency and Overbilling
Commentators and associates alike have bemoaned the trend in firms that
emphasize the quantity of billable hours over the quality of work performed.221
Walt Bachman, in a chapter called, "The Almighty Billable Hour," captured the
"ascendant importance of billable hours" by describing billable hours as "the
litmus test of the worth and financial success of a lawyer or law firm. 222 In The
Rodent, an underground newsletter for associates, one anonymous writer ex-
plained how his firm used billable hour production as a measuring stick for suc-
cess. Reportedly, firm partners chided the associate for not billing enough hours
but praised the associate when he racked up a large number of hours.223 In those
firms that emphasize quantity of hours over quality of work, associates largely
compete by racking up hours.224 As described by Dean Anthony T. Kronman:
The increased emphasis on hours billed as a criterion for measuring as-
sociate performance - which reflects in part the cultural devaluation of
other attributes less directly connected to the external good of money-
making and in part the administrative need for a uniform quantitative
standard of evaluation in firms whose size makes more-qualitative cri-
teria unworkable - has in turn propelled the competition of associates
more and more in this direction. Increasingly, associates at large firms
220 When dissatisfied associates leave a firm, their loss also affects client service because of the
learning curve caused by attorney attrition. See infra notes 272-99 and accompanying text for -a
discussion of how attrition affects firms and clients.
221 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow asserts that using billable hours to make more quantitative
than qualitative decisions creates instability in firms by reducing "bonding" between senior attor-
neys and associates and by creating a "time famine." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the
Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Law-
yering, 44 CASE W. RES L. REV. 621, 632 (1994).
222 BACHMAN, supra note 1, at 102. "A lawyer who allows his or her annual billable hours to slip
too low.., risks more than a decrease in income. Survival, of the lawyer within the firm... is at
stake." Id.
223 Paul Reidinger, Confessions of the Rodent, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 82-83.
224 Compare Quinn, supra note 50, at 133 (referring to the "time card mentality"), with Cornelia
Wallis, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time Based Billings by Attorneys, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1996,
at 14 (stating that a "lawyer's worth, his or her value to a law firm, is measured today by the num-
bers of hours billed").
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themselves equate success - promotion and prestige - with hours
billed.
225
In a work culture with minimum hour expectations, associates quickly learn
that falling below the minimum risks job loss and exceeding the minimum is
generously rewarded through bonuses,226 promotion to partner and an increased
profit share percentage.227 One legal auditor asserts that this type of "incentive
compensation" system is "virtually identical to the system condemned by con-
sumer protection enforcement officials in the automobile repair industry. 228
Query whether associates who are promoted and compensated largely on the ba-
sis of hours billed and collected are much different than automobile service per-
sonnel who are compensated for repair sales generated.229
One byproduct of quantifying law practice may be an increase in personnel
claims brought by disgruntled associates. 3 ° Some claims may be based on a
firm's refusal to invite an associate into the partnership ranks. With quantitative
evaluations of productivity and value, associates who have "numbers" compara-
ble to promoted associates may allege discrimination. For example, a female
associate in the Dallas based fin of Hughes & Luce filed a discrimination com-
plaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights after the firm did not pro-
mote her to partner.23' The associate claims that she met the firm's objective
criteria for partnership - the clients, the hours and the years. 32 By emphasizing
and rewarding objective accomplishments such as hour production, firms make
themselves vulnerable to such complaints.
225 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 302
(1993).
226 Following the recent wave of salary increases some firms acknowledged that they based bonuses
on hours billed. See, e.g., Salary Watch, TEX. LAW., Mar. 20, 2000, at 3 (describing how one Texas
firm's bonuses were based on the number of hours billed).
227 Boisvert, supra note 53, at 4.
228 Id. at 4 (explaining that regulators concluded that the "incentive compensation" system of re-
warding sales personnel for the number of repairs sold "created an atmosphere that encouraged the
sale of unnecessary repairs").229 See id. at 4 (insisting that law firm compensation systems based on hourly billings are no better
than the "incentive compensation" system attacked by the automobile repair regulators because
law firms "first impose what may be excessive hourly requirements," and then seek to reward those
who can actually exceed the minimum).
230 Associates who feel used or even abused may be more inclined to sue their employers. See
Andrea M. Alonso & Kevin G. Faley, The Law Firm Culture of Abuse, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1998, at
116 (describing verbal abuse and intimidation of associates). Firms that formally seek associate
feedback can deal with abuse and possibly improve associate morale. For example, the Denver-
based firm of Holland & Hart asks associates if they would want to work for particular partners
again. Jonathan Foreman, Poor People Skills Can Collapse Firms, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at
Al. The information obtained impacts partner compensation. Id. For a discussion of the mechan-
ics of associate review of partners, see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Re-
view in Law Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 329, 367 (1995).
231 Angela Ward, A Court-Ordered Partner?, Hughes & Luce Associate Seeks Unusual Ruling,
TEX. LAW., Aug. 2, 1999, at 1 (noting that the associate is awaiting a Texas Commission on Hu-
man Rights decision before she files a discrimination suit in state court).
232 Id.
[Vol. 69:239
SOUL FOR SALE
The results from the 1999-2000 Associate Survey revealed that many firms
do reward hours production, employing an incentive compensation that focuses
associate evaluations on hours billed and collected. Thirty-two percent of the
respondents noted that they "strongly agree" with the statement, "My income and
advancement within the firm are principally based on the number of hours that I
bill and collect." Another 44% indicated that they "somewhat agree" with the
statement. Comments also reflected the emphasis placed on hours billed. When
asked about their firms' annual billing requirements, four respondents volun-
teered that their firms' based bonuses on billable hours recorded or collected. In
the general comment section one respondent flatly stated, "[t]he firm has one
goal - maximize billing at any cost." One respondent referred to the "disturbing
trend" of firms to "reduce annual income in favor of a bonus system that is al-
most exclusively tied to billable hours." As the respondent explained, "Given
that the more lucrative bonuses kick in at 2300 plus, it is easy to see the allure of
'padding' the time sheet." Similarly, another respondent noted that "basing bo-
nuses 100% on billable hours ... encourages people to 'pad' their time."
Interestingly, professors David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati described
this exact consequence in discussing the partners' ability to monitor shirking by
associates. They suggest that using hours to measure associates' work creates an
incentive for associates to inflate their hours, "to the extent that associates be-
lieve that partners view hours as a surrogate for quality ...,, Moreover, "part-
ners will generally find it difficult to detect" when associates pad their hours be-
cause of the difficulty in correlating the quality and quantity of work produced.234
Padding may occur when attorneys overstate the amount of work actually
performed, overwork files, or fail to complete work in the most efficient
manner.2 35 In all these situations, inefficiency and even billing fraud may be
233 Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 165, at 1594.
234 Id. at 1594-96 (illustrating the "limited usefulness of using hours as a measure of associate ef-
fort"). The following illustrates how billable hours do not reflect quality or output:
The number of billable hours worked by Lawyer A in any particular time pe-
riod measures the amount of time required to do the work he or she did during
that period. The number of billable hours tells us nothing about the quality of,
or the quantity of, Lawyer A's work product. Lawyer B might have accom-
plished as much in half the time... Lawyer B who takes half the time might be
said to be twice as productive as Lawyer A. . . If one only considers the raw
number of hours each worked, B would be the least productive....
Musselman, supra note 43, at 28-29.
235 The Beyond the Breaking Point Report noted that lawyers "are being pushed to the edge by
myriad pressures" including "Incentives that fail to reward efficiency and effectiveness," and "in-
creasing temptations to keep hours or income up by overworking files, taking shortcuts, and per-
forming lower level routine work." BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. One
author theorizes that attorneys who increase the number of hours spent on matters "tend, on aver-
age, to overstate legal risks" in an effort to justify time spent on a matter. Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 392 (1997).
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rewarded when attorneys' worth is based on billables.236 Simply stated, hourly
billing creates an incentive to overwork files and misrepresent time because the
more hours an associate works, the more fees are generated.237 As observed by
one survey respondent, "The biggest problem I saw [at two medium sized firms]
was attorneys who billed for time they didn't work."
238
Attorneys may be tempted to overwork files and to bill for work they did
not actually do when they do not have enough work to meet the firm's billing
requirements. Professor Lerman explains that associates who do not have
enough work to legitimately bill the required number of hours must choose: "(1)
to do unnecessary work; (2) to lie about the number of hours worked; or (3) to
fail to meet the firm minimum and reduce her chances of become a partner,'' 239 or
even keeping her job. On the other hand, associates who have enough work to
fulfill the billing requirements, 240 and associates who have client contact,241 may
be less inclined to overwork files and to engage in other questionable billing
practices.
242
236 Ironically, hourly billing, which was "[o]riginally hailed for its objectivity and efficiency...
increasingly has been assailed for encouraging inefficiency, excessive litigation, and fraud." Ross,
supra note 53, at 2. Because of the incentives created, one commentator has characterized hourly
billing as a "devilish creature that rewards inefficiency and penalizes productivity." Elizabeth A.
Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each Passing
Hour, 20 STETSON L. REv. 419, 426 (1991) (quoting a National Law Journal commentator). Com-
pare David J. Waxse, Ethical Implications of Hourly Billing, J. KAN. B. ASs'N., Dec. 1998, at 2
(noting that hourly billing "creates disincentives for competent and prompt resolution in represen-
tations ... [b]ecause the lawyer is paid for time, not value...").
237 See Jones & Glover, supra note 7, at 295 (noting that clients are now rebelling and demanding
more efficiency).
238 The respondent stated that the "other big problem is attorneys that do not create timely time
sheets. Attorneys that try to recreate a month's worth of billing at the end of the month always end
up billing more time than they actually worked."
Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra note 5, at 674. One associate quoted by Lerman described the
"no win" situation as follows: "The problem is that they want these many hours, and you're looking
for work to do, and there is no work to do. You have to fudge." Id. at 714.
240 One respondent recognized that questionable billing practices may be less likely to occur when
attorneys have an adequate amount of work to handle. As that respondent stated, "Billable hours
have never been an issue as there is more legitimate work than we can handle. If we can keep our
clients happy - billable hours take care of themselves. I have only seen one or two instances of
'uestionable' billing practices."
A Distinguishing attorneys who have client contact from those who do not, one respondent sug-
gested that attorneys with client contact have a disincentive to over bill or overwork a file.
Depending on attorney intent and circumstances, over billing and other questionable billing
practices can expose attorneys to civil and criminal liability. Although former clients commonly
sue for breach of duty, breach of contract and misrepresentation, they can also cooperate with
prosecutors in bringing criminal charges. Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 62, 66. For an excellent analysis of billing and expense fraud cases, see
Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999).
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F. Billing Pressure and the Exodus of Ethical Associates
Another unintended consequence of quantifying law practice is that ethical
attorneys who do not pad or do not work long hours may be placed at a competi-
tive disadvantage come evaluation time. A couple of respondents referred to this
problem. One respondent who described his or her diligence in using an elec-
tronic timer program to bill by the minute, expressed frustration over colleagues
who estimate their time. The respondent stated, "I can't compete with estima-
tors, but I'm not willing to compromise my strict billing practice either." In not-
ing that the billable hours system "encourages lying," another respondent ex-
plained, "If you don't lie, you are perceived to be a slacker, even though, in real-
ity, you may work far more than others." "Slacker" associates may feel pressure
to change their practices or find other employment. Ethical associates who ref-
use to compromise their standards may become increasingly disillusioned in
having to compete with other associates who use questionable billing practices to
record hours. These ethical associates may voluntarily leave private practice.
Results from the 1999-2000 Associate Survey reveal that a large number of
respondents see the connection between pressure and ethical attorneys abandon-
ing private law practice. The questionnaire asked the respondents to indicate
their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Billing pressure
causes ethical and competent attorneys to leave private law practice." The larg-
est percentage of the respondents (31%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the
statement. Forty-six percent noted some level of agreement with the
statement.243 Personally, I think that this is the most disturbing survey result be-
cause it suggests that billing pressure may be causing firms to lose ethical associ-
ates and future leaders who uphold high ethical standards.
G. Rationalization and Degradation of Ethical Standards
For those attorneys who stay in private practice, another deleterious effect
of billing pressure is self-deception. Rather than admitting to themselves or to
others that they are engaging in questionable billing practices, some associates
may rationalize their conduct or delude themselves about client needs. Self-
delusion occurs when attorneys' self-interest in billing244 controls and attorneys
convince themselves that more work is necessarily better for the client. In his
243 Sixteen percent noted that they strongly agreed with the statement, and 30% indicated that they
somewhat agree with the statement that billing pressure causes ethical and competent attorneys to
leave private law practice. Thirteen percent indicated that they "somewhat disagree" with the
statement, and another 10% noted that they "strongly disagree."
244 See Ross, TH-E HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 6 (describing the inherent conflict of interest
between the client's need for expeditious work and the attorney's desire to bill time). For an inter-
esting examination of the psychology of self-deception and rationalization of unethical billing
practices, see Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, supra note 4. See also Schratz, supra note
4 (using psychological and socio-economic perspectives to analyze over billing). Even the termi-
nology used reveals some degree of denial. For example, attorneys use the term "padding" rather
than stealing or fraud. See Frederick Miller, If You Can't Trust Your Lawyer .... ?, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 785 (1990) (asserting that polite euphemisms reflect a kind of tolerance of deception).
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book based on two billing studies, Professor Ross contends that most over billing
is the result of self-deception rather than conscious fraud.245 Ross concludes:
"Perhaps the greatest danger is that some attorneys have become so accustomed
to rationalizing their liberal time recordation techniques or their decisions to per-
form endless services for their clients regardless of cost that they may not even
recognize that their actions are ethically questionable."246 This kind of rationali-
zation ultimately erodes ethical standards, harming clients,247 individual practi-
tioners248 and the legal profession.
The majority of respondents in the billing survey recognize the risk of at-
torneys rationalizing questionable conduct. When asked to note their agreement
or disagreement with the statement, "Attorneys tend to rationalize and justify
questionable billing practices," 64% indicated that they agreed. 249 Only 10%
disagreed with the statement.250  Again, this reflects a skeptical perspective in
which individual attorneys tolerate, and even justify, unethical conduct.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon refers to attorney acquiescence in describing
the rules of the current legal culture: "Keep your head down, don't ask questions
and bill as much as you can., 25' The failure to challenge unethical practices by
others leads to the degradation of ethical standards. According to Glendon, what
is "most eye opening about the legal profession these days... [is the way] in
which the ethical line has moved." 252 This lowering of the ethical bar hurts indi-
245 Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, supra note 6, at 63.
246 Id. at 261 (referring to one 1991 survey respondent "who stated that he and most other attorneys
who regularly bill more than 3600 hours per year do not perform unnecessary work or exaggerate
their hours").
247 As noted by Professor Lerman, "[c]lients and lawyers are harmed by dishonesty of lawyers who
lose track of the difference between truthfulness and rationalizing." Lisa G. Lerman, Gross Prof-
its? Questions About Lawyer Billing Practices, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 645, 651-52 (1994). In de-
scribing the "erosion of his own integrity," one attorney Lerman interviewed said "he could not
really think of anything anymore that he would not be able to justify doing." Id. at 652.
248 One commentator described the toll on attorneys' psyches as follows: "Most lawyers would like
to think of themselves as honest people - principled, conscientious and perhaps even caring. This
is an impossible hypocrisy if lawyers regularly bill their clients on some basis other than truth."
Quinn, supra note 50, at 137.
249 The 64% includes 41% who "somewhat agree" and 23% who "strongly agree" with the state-
ment.
250 Another 26% indicated that they neither. agreed nor disagreed with the statement. Of those
disagreeing, 4% checked "strongly disagree," and 6% checked "somewhat disagree."
251 Segal, supra note 42, at HI. "Most lawyers these days are perfectly decent people who feel like
they're trapped in a system that they don't really like, but a system that they don't feel safe trying
to buck."
252 Id. at HI. In an audience discussion at the 1994 Hofstra Conference on Gross Profits, Professor
Mary C. Daly explained how law students who condemn billing fraud in law school become so-
cialized once in the legal profession:
You have two groups of students, one group will go out into the profession and
they will be discouraged, disgusted by what they see and they will leave those
firms. The other group will not. They will accept the values of the partners
and they will adopt them as their own.
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vidual practitioners and their firms, as well as the legal profession and the public
they serve. As discussed in the next section, the same groups are all affected
adversely when billable hour pressure undermines meaningful mentoring in
firms.
H. Decline of Mentoring
Within law firms, the pressure to bill time and generate business creates a
competitive environment in which attorneys protect their turf, billings and cli-
ents.253 As stated in one ABA report, "The pressure to produce hours and the
shrinking bottom line have weakened firm loyalty and taught lawyers to protect
their turf.' , 254 The movement away from lock-step compensation systems to "eat
what you kill" objective systems results in partners focusing on billing, collecting
and generating business.255 Objective compensation systems that do not recog-
nize and reward other contributions, such as management and supervision time,
discourage partners from devoting time to such activities. 6  Attorneys func-
tioning in such a system face tremendous pressure to bill hours and generate
business, making it difficult for them to devote time to "non revenue" producing
endeavors, such as training and supervision.25 ' As described by Professor Patrick
Charles Silver, Conference on Gross Profits, Audience Discussion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 661, 663
(1994) (quoting Mary C. Daly, a law professor at Fordham University). This sentiment was echoed
by a managing partner of a San Francisco firm, who noted:
In every law firm, a moral tone is set at the top. If there is an element of greed
and overreaching, that is passed on below. The sad part is that too few lawyers
have decided to set their own moral compass. They have followed the partner
over the cliff.
Ricker, supra note 242, at 66.
253 See Merrilyn Astin Tarlton & Simon Chester, It's Broken But We Can Fix It: Developing a Plan
to Move the Profession Beyond the Breaking Point, 22 No. 2 LAW PRAC. MGMT. 24 (1996) (de-
scribing "[c]ompetition both within and outside the law firm" and "[wiork cultures that reduce
professional contribution to a simple 'hours derby' in the list of the pressures pushing lawyers "to
the edge").
254 BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
255 For a discussion in the shift in emphasis in firm compensation systems, see MARc GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 67-68
(1991). "Partners are under mounting pressure to maintain a high level of performance - and per-
formance that fits the business strategy of the firm." Id. at 67.
256 See Schiltz, supra note 148, at 739-46 (describing how the "bottom line" pressure has affected
mentoring). In urging firms to compensate managers, the executive director of Arter and Hadden,
LLP., warned, "If managers believe they are primarily paid to practice law under the firm's normal
compensation system, they will only perform management tasks to the extent that they do not inter-
fere with their practice activities." H. Edward Wesemann, Valuing Managers: Does Your Reward
System Send the Right Message to Practice Group Leaders?, LAW PRAC. MGMT., May/June 2000,
at 39, 41. The same principle applies to partners' willingness to serve as supervisors and mentors.
257 Training and supervision become non-revenue producing activities when clients refuse to pay
for time devoted to those activities. See Schiltz, supra note 148, at 743. When clients refuse to pay
for attorneys talking with one another, "every hour that a senior lawyer spends mentoring a junior
lawyer costs the law firm whatever one or both of the attorneys would have billed had they not
been talking with each other." Id.
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Schiltz, the "pressure to bill hours - pressure to 'bill or be banished' - is neces-
sarily pressure not to mentor., 258 Similarly, the emphasis on business generation
can undermine meaningful supervision because an "hour devoted to bringing in
business is valued much more today than an hour devoted to mentoring a junior
colleague."
Although firms may pronounce a commitment to training and supervision,
few firms relieve partners of the billable hour constraints.260 According to David
Maister, a former Harvard Business School professor, law firms continue to
value the billable hour production over training, despite the recognition that
training would improve the entire firm's productivity.2 6 1 Law firm managers
attending management conferences report that the internal tension that inhibits
adequate mentoring, supervision, and communication comes primarily from two
sources: "constant demands on partners' time for myriad responsibilities (such as
client relationships, marketing, billing, and firm management), and the existence
of few, if any, tangible rewards for time spent on mentoring, supervision and
communication., 262 In short, immediate "bottom-line" incentives in firms con-
tribute to the decline of mentoring, adversely affecting junior attorneys, their
firms and clients.263
The lack of meaningful monitoring and training stifles associates' profes-
sional and personal growth.2 64 Without mentoring, associates struggle to learn
258 Id. at 740 (asserting that the "extraordinary pressure to bill hours is almost single-handedly
responsible for the death of mentoring"). Compare LaMothe, supra note 41, at 2 (reporting on a
Seventh Circuit study that indicated that billable hour pressure leaves "no time for informal training
and communications of ideals and values to young attorneys").
259 Schiltz, supra note 148, at 741. Professor Schiltz explains that attorneys who do not have their
own book of business "find it increasingly difficult to prosper, no matter how valuable their other
contributions." Id. "In virtually every firm, rainmakers are the highest paid partners." Todd S.
Lundy, Partner Compensation, An Ongoing Challenge, 14 No. 1 LEGAL MGMT. 18 (1995).
260 Baker, supra note 16, at 43 (quoting Maister, author of the book MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL
SERVICE FIRM, who noted that some firms "officially" require partners take part in coaching and
mentoring of associates).
261 Id. (stating that the "billable hour is the only thing of value in the law firm").
262 Christine White, Improving Associate Retention Through Professional Development, 5 No. 1
LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP& BEN. REP. 1 (1999).
263 "The lack of training (in substantive matters and professionalism) results in lower competence
of the 'bar in general, which may contribute to the negative public perception of lawyers." Cindy
Ching, Focus on Member Service, HAw. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 4. As explained by William R. Ross,
"the tendency of senior attorneys to discourage junior attorneys from seeking out their advice often
leads to wasted time and excessive billing." Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, supra note
4, at 2205.
264 The report on the 1991 national conference summarized the problem and consequences as fol-
lows: "Many partners are so busy billing hours that they either do not have the time, or have lost
interest in making time, to provide associates or junior partners with the substantive and career
feedback and mentoring that is vital to both the development of young careers and the future health
of the law firm." BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5-6. According to the
report, conference participants repeatedly raised the lack of training and mentoring in firms. Id. at
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how to practice law competently and ethically.2 65  Without committed mentors,
associates may not bond with partners or feel committed to the firm.266 This in-
creases the likelihood of associate attrition, which hurts both the firm and the
quality of work performed.267 In turn, this attrition may cause firm partners to
minimize time devoted to supervising and training associates.268 Partners may
be reluctant to jeopardize their own billings and collections in order to invest in
associates who may be gone next week or next year.269
The 1999-2000 Associate Survey sought opinions on whether billing and
business generation pressure on partners affected their willingness to serve as
mentors and supervisors. The specific inquiry asked respondents to indicate their
agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Because of the pres-
sure on partners to bill and generate business, partners in my firm do not provide
the mentoring and training that I need and want." The percentages of respon-
dents who agreed or disagreed with the statement were approximately the same,
with 43% indicating that they agreed and 42% indicating that they disagreed.27°
For the reasons discussed in the next section, firms that train and treat associates
as human investments are more likely to retain associates than firms that treat
associates as expendable commodities.271
I. Billable Hour Pressure and Attrition
Over the last five years, associate attrition has become a major concern of
firm managers who are losing associates in droves.272 These managers under-
265 See Schiltz, supra note 148, at 721-22 (asserting that teaching young attorneys to practice law
ethically is far more important than teaching them to "practice law well").
266 Menkel-Meadow, Culture.Clash, supra note 221, at 632.
267 As explained by Professor Ross, "a firm that fails to nurture the professional skills of its junior
attorneys is sowing the seeds of incompetence in its senior ranks." Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, su-
pra note 6, at 231.
2 See S. Elizabeth Wilbom & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Views from the Front: A Dialog About
the Corporate Law Firm, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1293, 1303 (1996) (comparing getting to know an
associate to adopting a Thanksgiving turkey as a pet).
269 Sally Schmidt, a legal market researcher who interviewed dozens of associates in the NALP
Keeping the Keepers study, made a similar observation in explaining that firm partners find it diffi-
cult to invest the time in training associates when three years from now the associates will be with
your competitor. Baker, supra note 16, at 43.
270 These percentages break down to 18% who "strongly agree," 25% who "somewhat agree," 24%
who "somewhat disagree," 18% who "strongly disagree" and 15% who "neither agree nor dis-
agree."
271 Peter J. Kalis, the chair of the management committee at Pittsburgh's Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
L.L.P., described the shift in attitude as follows: "For a long time, when it was a buyer's market,
law firms treated associates as commodities .... Now it's a seller's market. It's come full circle,
and young lawyers are treating law firms as commodities. We're getting what we deserve."
Cynthia Cotts, How Firms Keep Their Associates on the Job: Innovative Programs Slow Pace of
Lawyer Attrition, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1998, at Al, A18.
272 See White, supra note 262, at 1 (indicating that associate attrition has been a significant issue in
law firm management circles since 1995). A number of ABA groups have examined associate
attrition and retention. For example, in 1999, the ABA's Business Law Section sponsored a session
called, "You Can't Just Throw Money at Them," and an issue of the Law Practice Management
20001
UMKC LA W REVIEW
stand the enormous tangible and intangible costs of attrition.2 73 The tangible or
direct costs that can be quantified include compensation and benefits, agency
fees, recruiting expenses and signing bonuses.274 With attorney turnover, the
firm also loses revenue if one or more lawyers write off the time needed to get
the replacement up to speed on matters that the departed attorney handled.275
Intangible or indirect costs include damaged client relations, bruised firm morale,
time devoted to filling vacant positions and the loss of talented attorneys.276
While intangible costs are difficult to quantify, studies have revealed that each
incidence of attrition can cost up to $200,000 (depending on geographic region,
lawyer seniority, and other factors).277 Because of the staggering costs associated
with attorney attrition, many firms are examining the reasons associates give for
leaving firms.278
Firm managers interested in learning more about the causes of and solu-
tions for attrition should consult the Keeping the Keepers Report based on the
comprehensive NALP study on attrition.279 According to the report, the "deci-
sion to stay or leave either a particular firm or practice was relatively easy for the
associates. ' , 280 The NALP study found that the decision of associates to leave a
firm is most frequently affected by factors, which include the availability of
mentoring and the "unspoken firm policy on the balance of law practice and
life. 2 81 As discussed above, the hours derby undermines both mentoring and the
ability of firm attorneys to balance their personal and professional lives.28
Section magazine included five articles on "human capital" and turnover. See LAW PRAC. MGMT.,
May/June 1999, at 49.
273 See, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, Waging a War of Attrition, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1999, at Al
(quoting the manager of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld L.L.P., who said, "[h]igh attrition is
the single biggest-cost factor that can be averted").
274 Gerald L. Holt, How to Keep Talent from Walking, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 1999, at 5.
275 William G. Johnson, Seeing Red? Managing the Cost of Associate Attrition, LAW PRAC.
MGMT., May/June 1999, at 45.
276 In identifying intangible costs, one commentator noted that "clients repeatedly list associate
turnover as a major concern." Holt, How to Keep Talent from Walking, supra note 274, at 5.
277 Johnson, Booknarks, supra note 127, at 45. Compare Goldhaber, Are Salary Hikes Bad for
Associates?, supra note 62, at A15 (citing a legal consultant who estimates that the hard cost of
losing a mid-level associate is $200,000 to $250,000 and possibly more in New York).
278 Some firms use exit interviews to learn why associates leave. For a description of one firm's
experience in using exit interviews in developing a retention policy, see David R. Snodgrass, One
Firm's Push to Retain Associates, TEX. LAW., Oct. 19, 1998, at 24.
279 KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14. The study obtained quantitative data on the re-
tention status of more than 10,000 new associates hired between 1988 and 1996. Id. at 11. Phase
II of the study obtained qualitative information from 13 focus groups involving more than 30 asso-
ciates who had practiced three to five years. Id. at 12. The study found that 26.5% of new associ-
ates left their first law firm jobs within two years, and 64.6% quit within five years. Id. at 54.28
1 Id. at 14.
211 Id. Other factors identified in the "Overview of Findings" were the amount of feedback, the
juality of attorney management and the amount of communication with the partnership. Id.
Attorney search consultants also identify hours pressure and the lack of mentoring as reasons
why associates change jobs. Martha Fay Africa, Why Associates Leave, LAW PRAC. MGMT., May/
June 1999, at 49 (describing the top 10 reasons that associates report to headhunters). Under-
standing the connection between hours, mentoring and associate retention, some large firms have
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The results of the 1999-2000 Associate Survey also revealed that hourly
pressure plays a prominent role in pushing associates toward the exit door.
Overall, 39% of respondents reported that they were "[I]nterested in changing
employers during the next two years." Considering variables such as years li-
censed, tenure with the firm 283 and status, the group of respondents not on the
partnership track had a keen interest in changing positions. Of this group, 57%
indicated that they were interested in changing jobs. Of those respondents whose
income was less than $50,000, the majority (54%) indicated that they would be
interested in changing jobs in two years.284 Media reports of skyrocketing asso-
ciate salaries may lead associates in the lowest incomes category to look for
greener grass. As shown in Table 4 below, a large percentage of the respondents
(24%) list "increased compensation" as the most influential factor in causing
respondents to change jobs. 285
Table 4
Factors Most Influential in Causing Respondents to Change Jobs
Reduction of work hours 28%
Increased compensation 24%
More interesting work 18%
Enhanced training and supervision 8%
More respectful treatment 7%
Meaningful expectation of partnership 3%
Other 286  12%
lowered attrition. For example, Fulbright & Jawoski, L.L.P. credits its 7% attrition rate to a
mentoring program that requires mentors to certify that associates have hit certain "milestones."
The partner with the Detroit-based firm of Plundett & Cooney, P.C. attributes the firm's low attri-
tion rate to "decent hours and avid mentoring." Goldhaber, Are Salary Hikes Bad for Associates?,
supra note 62, at A 14, A 15.
283 In considering the number of years in a position, 46% of associates who had been with their
firms from 12 to 36 months indicated that they were interested in changing jobs during the next two
years.
In contrast, of those respondents making $125,000 to $159,999 a year, only 25% reported that
they were interested in changing jobs.
285 in the NALP study, "[a]n overwhelming number of associates agreed that compensation was one
of the top factors in the decision to begin their legal career in private practice." KEEPING THE
KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 13. The study also found that compensation was a factor
influencing associates' choice of a particular firm. Id. at 28. "Participants in the focus groups
indicated that money diminished in importance once they began their first job." Id. at 30.
286 Those respondents who checked "other" provided an assortment of professional and personal
reasons such as "changing cities" and "changing specialty." Of the 52 descriptions, eight involvea
a reduction in hours.
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The largest percentage of respondents (28%) who are most interested in
changing jobs for a reduction in hours mirrors the responses of the NALP focus
group participants who described the "firms unspoken policy on balance of law
practice and life" as one of the major reasons associates change jobs. In contrast
to the NALP focus group participants who described "mentoring" among the
factors that frequently played a role in decision to leave, only 8% of the respon-
dents in the 1999-2000 Associate Survey checked "enhanced training and super-
vision" as the most influential factor in causing them to change jobs.
One explanation for the difference between the NALP study and the 1999-
2000 Associate Survey relates to the methodology of the studies. The NALP
findings came from focus group discussions. By contrast, the 1999-2000 Associ-
ate Survey used a mail questionnaire, providing anonymity to the respondents.
With anonymity, respondents tend to be more candid than focus group partici-
pants. In a focus group setting, associates may be less inclined to admit that they
are interested in more compensation or want a reduction in hours. Focus group
participants who do not want to appear to be "materialistic" or "lazy" may prefer
to say that they are changing jobs for more training and mentoring, believing that
such a response is socially and professionally acceptable.287
The results of the 1999-2000 Associate Survey also revealed a relationship
between respondents' identification of the most important job goal and the factor
that was most influential in causing respondents to change jobs. For example, of
the respondents who identified "enhanced training and supervision" as the most
important factor in causing them to change jobs, 64% identified "training and
experience" as the one goal that they were "most interested" in attaining in their
work. In response to the general question that asked respondents to identify the
most important goal in their work, the largest percentage (35%) checked "re-
warding work,, 288 followed by 20% who checked "training and experience," and
19% who checked "financial rewards. 2 89 Forty-three percent of the female re-
spondents reported "rewarding work" as the goal they were most interested in
attaining, compared to 30% of the male respondents. 90
287 In a presentation on associate attrition, Abbie F. Willard, associate dean for Career Services at
Georgetown University Law Center, suggested that male associates in exit interviews might be
reluctant to admit that they were changing jobs for a reduction in hours. Willard made this obser-
vation in response to an audience member who suggested that more female associates than male
associates left the firm because they wanted more of a balance between their personal and profes-
sional lives. Abbie F. Willard, Address at the ABA Section of Business Law, Committee on Law
Firms session, Throwing Money (at Them) Is Not Enough: New Strategies for Associate Retention
(Aug. 7, 1999).
288 The percentage of respondents listing "rewarding work" increased with age, number of years
licensed and number of years at the firm.
289 These results are similar to reports provided by NALP focus group participants who described
the factors affecting their initial job choice. Compensation, along with sophistication of work,
training opportunities, prestige and enhancing future options were the most important factors de-
scribed in the NALP Keeping the Keepers Report, supra note 14, at 21-22.
290 The percentage of respondents that checked "financial rewards" as their most important goal
also revealed a gender difference. While 14% of the female respondents checked "financial re-
wards, 23% of the male respondents did so. Although the categories used in a St. Louis Bar Asso-
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Despite the commonly held belief that student debt pushes many new attor-
neys to seek high paying positions,291 only 7% of the respondents indicated that
"paying off student loans" was the most important job goal.292 This result sup-
ports the view advanced by Professor Schiltz that the "number of students whose
economic circumstances compel them to take big firm jobs is still substantially
smaller than the number of students who claim that their economic circumstances
compel them to take big firm jobs. 293
Among the survey respondents who indicated that they were interested in
changing employers, the largest percentage (37%) checked "corporate counsel
position" as the type of job they would prefer.294 Firm managers who understand
the lure of corporate counsel positions are employing various "silver seatbelt"
measures to retain attorneys.295 When the "silver seatbelt" measures do not pre-
vent an attorney from going in-house, the firm must then attempt to woo business
from its former attorney. Ironically, the former attorney's experiences at the firm
will inform their decision on retaining outside counsel.296
In addition to the 37% of the respondents in the 1999-2000 Associate Sur-
vey who indicated that they were interested in a corporate counsel position, 22%
of the respondents indicated that they were interested in a "non-legal job." Taken
ciation survey were different, in that survey only 7% of the respondents indicated that making a
"substantial income" was the most important work goal. Striving for Happiness, A.B.A. J., July
1995, at 41.
291 See KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 29. "Associates report that the burden of
high educational debt has added new importance to an entry level salary that is consistent with the
market rate."
292 For a discussion of the repayment burden on graduates and the consequences for graduate edu-
cation, see Michael A. Olivas, Paying for a Law Degree: Trends in Student Borrowing and the
Ability to Repay Debt, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333 (Sept. 1999). A graduate who repays a $60,000 loan
over ten years at 8% must make a monthly payment of $730. The monthly payment goes down to
$451 if the term of the loan is extended to 30 years at an interest rate of 8.25%. Id. at 335.
293 Schiltz, supra note 14, at 935-36 (citing ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS
OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 152-53 (1992)).
294 Associates, like partners, appear to be attracted to corporate counsel positions. According to a
1999 American Lawyers survey of partners at large firms, more that one third of the respondents
ages 41 and under indicated that they expect to leave their firms for a general counsel position.
Peter D. Zeughauser, Time to Buckle Up?, AM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 51.
295 In addition to cash bonuses, firms are using other financial incentives and rewards. Id Recently,
the San Francisco-based firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison took a novel step in attempting to
stem the departure for general counsel positions. See Lisa Fipps & Brenda Sandburg, Brobeck
Clients Must Pay Percentage If They Hire Firm's Lawyers, TEx. LAW., May 22, 2000, at 19 (ex-
plaining that the Brobeck firm is the first in the country to use the approach). At Brobeck all firm
engagement agreements with clients now include a provision in which the client agrees "to pay
25% of the first-year salaries of attorneys lured from the firm." See also Jill Schachner Chanen, Pay
to Hire Away, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 20 (describing the firm's efforts to recoup costs associated
with recruiting and training attorneys). Evidently, the firm's managers have opted to create an
obstacle for departing attorneys in lieu of attempting to address the factors that lead attorneys to
seek corporate counsel positions.
296 Increasingly, corporate counsel are questioning high associate salaries and billables. See Law-
yers Respond to Slam on Associate Salaries, TEX. LAW., Apr. 24, 2000, at 62 (providing attorneys'
reactions to an in-house attorney's complaints that firms charge "outrageous fees to your clients
(me) in order to pay completely inexperienced lawyers more than I make").
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together, these results reveal that a majority of the respondents are considering
leaving private law practice.
A number of respondents also expressed some reservations about their se-
lection of law as a profession. The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "I wish that I had
selected a profession other than the law." Eight percent of the respondents
checked that they "strongly agree, "18% of respondents noted that they "some-
what agree," 20% of the respondents indicated that they "somewhat disagree,"
and the largest percentage (36%) reported that they "strongly disagree. 297 These
findings suggest that the majority of respondents appear to be at least comfort-
able, if not pleased, with their decision to practice law.298 Reading these findings
with the results on the number of respondents who expressed interest in a corpo-
rate counsel position, it appears as if a large number of respondents want to leave
private practice, not the legal profession itself. This exodus should concern firm
managers and the legal profession, especially if unhealthy work environments
lead to a departure of the "best and brightest." 
2 99
J. Billable Hour Pressure Affecting Educational Programs, Ethics
Training and Pro Bono Service
Law firms, the legal profession and clients will also be adversely affected if
billable hour pressure contributes to a decline in time devoted to training and
education programs. Undeniably, quality representation requires diligence in
staying abreast of recent developments.300 Given the ethical traps and the com-
297 Eighteen percent reported that they "neither agree nor disagree" with the statement.
298 Other surveys have asked similar questions probing into respondents' satisfaction with law as a
career. Twenty-three percent of the respondents in the 1991 North Carolina Survey indicated that
they would not become attorneys again, and only 54% indicated that they wanted to remain in law
practice for the remainder of their careers. North Carolina Task Force Report, supra note 180, at
4. By comparison, 23% of the respondents in a 1990 New Jersey survey revealed that they "plan to
leave law practice before they retire." Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay?, supra note 139, at
62. In a 1988 Maryland Bar Association survey, nearly one third of the respondents reported that
"they were not sure whether they wanted to continue practicing law," Id. at 62.
299 Timothy Harper, The Best and Brightest, Bored and Burned Out, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at
28. Those who remain in stressful work situations may be those without job options and those who
commit themselves to private law practice, possibly at the expense of their personal lives. See also
BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 30 (noting that unsound management
practices that "contribute to lawyer departures or to decreased levels of performance" directly "im-
pact a law firm's long-term economic strength and cohesion"). For an "anthology of insights and
history" of attorneys who have left law practice, see DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW
xiv (1989).
300 Understanding the connection between competency and education, "[a]pproximately 37 states
now require that lawyers participate in continuing education programs as a condition of licensure."
Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the
Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by US. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1141 (1999).
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plex nature of law practice, attorneys must also devote time to ethics training.30 1
When attorneys minimize the time devoted to training and educational programs
the lawyer and work product both suffer.
The 1999-2000 Associate Survey revealed that billable hour pressure is
causing a number of respondents to minimize the time they devote to these pro-
grams. The survey asked respondents to note their opinion on the following
statement: "Because of billable hour pressure, I minimize my participation in
continuing legal education programs and ethics training." Forty percent indi-
cated some level of disagreement with the statement, compared to 42% of the
respondents who indicated some level of agreement.3 °2 Associates facing high
billable hour requirements may only complete the minimum number of CLE
hours required by bar regulators. In those situations, associates continue to learn,
provided the time is on some client's clock.
Similarly, the emphasis on billable hours may result in pro bono and com-
munity service representing a smaller slice of the workday.3 3 Recently, com-
mentators have warned that rising salaries, coupled with the corresponding in-
creases in hourly expectations, will devastate pro bono.3°  In referring to in-
creases in salaries and billing requirement, Lynne Liberato, the 2000 president of
the State Bar of Texas, said, "It seems logical that this would have a negative
effect because there's only so many hours in the day .... If you have to devote
more of those hours to client services, you have less time for other things. 3 °5
301 At least 20 states, including Texas, require more than one hour of continuing legal education
(CLE) annually be devoted to ethics and/or professionalism. Frank X. Neuner, Jr., Mandatory
Professionalism: A Cure for an Infectious Disease, LA. B.J., (June 1997), at 18, 20.
302 The agreement/disagreement percentages break down as follows: 16% checked "strongly
agree"; 26% checked "some what agree"; 23% checked "somewhat disagree"; and 17% checked
"strongly disagree." Eighieen percent checked "neither agree nor disagree."
303 Describing the changes in law practice at the National Conference on the Emerging Crisis in the
Quality of Lawyer's Health and Lives - Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services, one respon-
dent noted:
You still have the same 24 hours a day .... But the slices of the 24-hour day
are somewhat different. When I started, work was always the largest, but it
wasn't the only slice... [now] Leisure time, pro bono, bar work, work in your
church, work in your town - these slices are, unfortunately, in danger of be-
coming extinct.
BREAKING POINT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3.
304 According to Michael D. Goldhaber, a journalist who writes a column called, "Associates," the
"typical new pay scale starts, implicitly or explicitly, at 1,950, with hefty bonus benchmarks at
2,100, 2,250, and 2,400" hours. Michael D. Goldhaber, A Look Back on the Great Raise of '00,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 27, 2000, at A27. Goldhaber predicts that the "new pay scale will hasten the
death of lockstep, the death of pro bono, the death of honest billing and the death of leisure." Id.
David Stem, director of the National Association for Public Interest Law, shared this view on pro
bono in stating, "One way or the other ... this is going to have a devastating effect on pro bono."
Id.
305 Lisa M. Whitley, Time Well Spent? Rising Salaries and the Effect on Pro Bono, TEX. LAW.,
June 26, 2000, at S62. Liberato questioned the amount of effect and stated: "Logic tells me there
will be an impact, but experience tells me there won't be as much of an impact as one might think."
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In an individual law firm, the effect on pro bono and community service
will depend largely on the firm policy on credit for pro bono hours. 306 If the firm
gives pro bono hours the same weight as billable hours, an increase in the firm's
billable hour requirement should have little immediate effect on an attorney's
willingness to spend time on pro bono or community service.307  Firms who
change their policy to give credit for pro bono report an actual increase in the
amount of pro bono work performed.308  On the other hand, raising the annual
billing requirement can undermine an attorney's willingness and even ability to
handle pro bono matters if the firm limits the number of pro bono hours that
"count" toward the billing requirement.3°
Among the firms represented in the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, the ma-
jority (65%) do not accord the same weight to pro bono hours as billable hours.
Eighteen percent of the respondents indicated that their firms did accord the same
weight to pro bono hours. Those firms that do give the same weight to pro bono
hours create incentives for those associates who want to provide pro bono serv-
ice. One survey respondent described the dilemma faced by those attorneys who
desire to do pro bono work: "I am fairly active doing pro bono work, but I do it at
my own detriment."
As revealed in the survey, the majority of the associates appear to recognize
that pro bono service is a casualty of the hours derby. 310 Twenty-seven percent
of the associates noted that they "strongly agree" with the statement, "Because of
billable hour pressure, I don't have time to participate in pro bono and public
service activities," and 35% checked that they "somewhat agree" with the state-
ment.311  These results suggest that both the legal services community and the
community at large lose participation of many overworked attorneys who believe
Id. Reportedly, some "firms are telling their people to do less pro bono." Id. (quoting Kelly Frels,
managing partner of Houston-based Bracewell & Patterson).
306 Firms may give no credit, partial credit, full credit or a combination of these approaches. For
example, a firm may give full credit for pro bono work up to a certain limit. One survey respon-
dent indicated that his or her firm generally gave half credit for pro bono work.
307 "Counting pro bono" sends a powerful message on management support of pro bono service.
As explained by Larry Fox, a partner at the Philadelphia firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath and chair
of the ABA's Special Committee on Death Penalty Representation, "firms that are serious about
their commitment to pro bono should count a certain percentage of associates' pro bono hours
toward their billable hour benchmarks .. " Mark Hansen, Trickle-Away Economies? Cost of High
First-Year Salaries May Be Borne by Pro Bono Recipients, A.B.A. J., July 2000, at 20. Fox also
thinks that the latest round of pay hikes may give firms "wanting to duck pro bono another excuse
for avoiding it." Id.
308 See Whitley, Time Well Spent?, supra note 305 (describing a 25% increase in pro bono after
Houston-based Vinson & Elkins changed the firm policy to give full billable credit for all pro bono
work).
309 Recently, the firm of Pillsbury Madison & Sutro L.L.P. "largely stopped counting pro bono
hours toward its hourly minimum billables requirement." Goldhaber, A Look Back on the Great
Raise of '00, supra note 304, at A27.
310 See generally Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 229-36 (discussing the effects of time-
based billing on public responsibilities and professional growth).
311 Another 15% indicated that they "somewhat disagree," and 8% noted that they "strongly dis-
agree." Fifteen percent indicated that they "neither agree nor disagree."
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that they do not have time to participate in pro bono and public service
activities.
K. The Effect on the Attorney-Client Relationship and Public Image
of Attorneys
Billable hours pressure can also hurt attorneys' relationships with their cli-
ents and the public image of attorneys. In describing the harmful effect that
billing pressure has on attorney-client relationships, one in-house counsel sug-
gests that "a work environment in which billable hours are king" breeds "a per-
verse lack of respect for the client., 3t 3 In such an environment, "[t]he client is
seen as a necessary inconvenience with deep pockets, a cash cow for whom
service is defined by what will keep the dollars coming in, and not necessarily
what the best service is for the client's needs. 31 4 This kind of skepticism and
concern over attorney billing practices has helped spawn legal bill auditing as a
cottage industry.31 5 Despite attorney resistance, high billing quotas may lead to
the expansion of auditing and other types of scrutiny of legal bills and practice.31 6
Inevitably, the hours derby will adversely affect the public image of attor-
neys.31 7 Public opinion polls, 3 8 as well as popular jokes, reveal that billing and
fees are at the heart of much of the criticism. Imposing high billable hour re-
quirements on attorneys validates the view of skeptics who insist that attorneys
312 Cf Ross, THE HONEST HouR, supra note 6, at 235-36 (reporting that in both his 1991 and 1994-
95 surveys, the majority of the respondents indicated that replacement of hourly billing with other
forms of billing would have no substantial effect on pro bono work and other community service
activities by attorneys).
M3 Daniel S. Hapke, Jr., Professionalism, Quality, and Hourly Billing... Are They Compatible?,
11 No. 3 ACCA DOCKET 30, 34 (1993).
314 id.
315 James P. Schratz, Cross-Examining a Legal Auditor, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. Rav. 41, 42 (1996).
For a discussion of the reasons for the growth of legal audits, see Claire Hamner Matturro, Auditing
Attorneys'Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a Growing Trend, FLA. B.J., May 1999, at 14.
316 See generally Larry Smith, Legal Auditors Expand Their Practice Amid Growing Criticism, 7
No. 10 INSIDE LITIG. 24 (1993). Some sophisticated clients are now questioning billing quotas, and
some are refusing to pay for new attorneys "learning on the client's clock." In a presentation at the
AALS Mini-Workshop on Major Issues of the 21st Century - Radical Change and Radical Stasis:
Lawyers, Law School, and Changing Conceptions of Work in the Next Century, Jan. 6, 2000,
James J. Sandman, a partner at Arnold & Porter, explained that clients are increasingly unwilling to
invest in training of associates and to pay the increases in hourly rates.
317 See ABA Opinion 93-379, supra note 106, at 1 (noting that billing practices of some attorneys
are "a major contributing factor to the discouraging public opinion of the legal profession").
318 See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (reporting
on "a National Law Journal/West Publishing Company poll of the public attitudes toward lawyers
and the role of law in society"). See also Editorial, Challenge for Lawyers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 17, 1993, at 18 ( noting that "[p]olls indicate [lawyers'] approval ratings dropping
as legal fees rise"); Schratz, supra note 4, at 2214 (stating that "[a] recent survey of 3000 CEO's,
CFO's and General Counsels by the Chicago based accounting firm... found that almost half of
those surveyed believed their attorneys were over billing" ).
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are driven by the "the buck.",319 This undermines public trust and confidence in
the legal profession.
IV. POSSIBLE CHANGES TO ADDRESS THE DELETERIOUS
EFFECTS OF INCREASED BILLABLE HOUR EXPECTATIONS
The discussion of the effects of increased billable hours expectations and
related study findings reveal how the hours derby has transformed law firm cul-
ture and economics, adversely impacting individual attorneys, firms, the legal
profession and the consuming public. Given the multifaceted and complex na-
ture of the problems facing individual lawyers and their firms, 320 some attorneys
and firm managers may be resigned to working in a "broken" profession.
321
Rather than assuming that little can be done, creative and dedicated attorneys
should explore changes within firms and within the regulatory and competitive
environments in which firms operate.
A. Law Firms Should Reengineer Firm Economics and Culture
As discussed above, current compensation systems in firms have contrib-
uted, if not caused, various problems related to emphasizing billable hours and
business generation. To address these problems firm managers must rethink
compensation systems for partners, as well as for associates. The review of firm
compensation systems should focus on identifying the conduct that the system
rewards.322 Specifically, the firm's compensation system - as well as its policies,
procedures and structures - should encourage ethical practice and motivate asso-
ciates and partners alike to behave in ways that are beneficial to the firm and its
clients.
1. Emphasize quality and ethical behavior over quantity.
In examining associate compensation systems, firms should not award
bonuses based on numerical billing benchmarks. In lieu of rewarding "heavy
handed" billers, firm managers and supervisors should scrutinize the work of
associates who regularly bill an extraordinary number of hours. Depending on
the circumstances, firms could audit the bills of attorneys who bill over a certain
319 In a 1998 telephone survey of Texans regarding trust and confidence in the courts and the legal
profession, 35% of the survey respondents who had a negative opinion of lawyers indicated that
their opinion was based on the feeling that "lawyers are driven by money." TEXAS SUPREME COURT
ET AL., PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN TEXAS 31
(1998).
320 See Alfini & Van Vooren, supra note 11, at 66 (asserting that the enormity of the lawyer stress
problem requires a multi-pronged approach to finding its solution).
321 At a program sponsored by the ABA Law Practice Management Section's Beyond the Breaking
Point Task Force, Michael Beatty, former general counsel of Coastal Corporation, compared the
legal profession to a failing airline. Mark Hansen, Lawyer Analysis: How to Find Happiness in
Competition, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 116. Beatty suggested that the ABA "adopt as its theme song
'Call Me Cleopatra 'Cause I'm the Queen of Denial."' Id.
322 KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 47.
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level, such as 2100 hours a year. 32 1 When possible, firms should recognize and
reward ethical conduct. For example, firms could expressly include ethical con-
duct as a criterion in evaluating and compensating associates. 324  Such moves
would send a strong message to firm attorneys and clients that the firm values
quality over quantity.
325
Adopting clear billing guidelines and providing training on billing also
communicates the firm's commitment to ethical practice. Firm managers take a
head-in-the-sand approach when they require associates produce a high number
of billable hours without giving associates specific guidelines on how to bill ethi-
cally. Firm partners may financially benefit from questionable billing practices
by taking the position that "If I don't see it, it's not happening." The survey re-
sults suggest that the failure to implement and enforce clear billing guidelines
hurt ethical associates who refuse to engage in questionable practices.326 As dis-
cussed above, approximately half of the respondents indicated that they "agree"
or "somewhat agree" with the following statement: "Billing pressure causes ethi-
cal and competent attorneys to leave private law practice." Furthermore, those
attorneys who stay in private practice may rationalize questionable practices. 32
7
Firm managers can counter these serious effects of billing hour pressure by im-
plementing and monitoring clear billing guidelines.328
An in-house ethics counsel or committee could take responsibility for pro-
viding training and monitoring billing practices. Designation of an ethics counsel
or committee provides a channel through which ethical attorneys can proffer
questions and concerns related to billing and ethical problems. Firm attorneys
will be less reluctant to report billing problems if the ethics counsel or committee
329ensures that employees who report misconduct are protected from retaliation.
2. Create incentives for mentors and supervisors.
The quality of associate work and retention of associates will also be im-
proved if firms compensate partners for time devoted to mentoring, supervision
and training. Partner compensation systems that do not reward supervision time
323 Firms concerned about being burned by billing errors, are increasing auditing themselves. Erin
White, More Law Firms Are Auditing Themselves to Catch Billing Errors, WALL ST. J., July 14,
1998, at B8. Professor Lerman recommends "systematic audits" of the billing practices of lawyers
who bill 2000 hours per year or more. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 298.
324 See Sarat, supra note 92, at 827 (quoting an associate who said that partners treat ethics "as a
matter of sanctioning people for bad behavior rather than rewarding good behavior").
325 For recommendations on how firms can emphasize quality, over quantity, see generally Ronald
M. Martin, The Empowered Law Firm - Driving Empowerment: Reengineering Our Context, 20
No. 7 LAW PRAC. MGMT. 34 (1994).
326 Close to three quarters of the respondents (71%) indicated that they agreed or somewhat agreed
with the following statement: "Clear billing guidelines would help attorneys who want to practice
ethically." See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.327 See supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
328 See Lerman, Gross Profits?, supra note 247, at 652. "Lawyers in private practice need to ex-
plore how time is recorded by other lawyers in their own law firms, and to establish policies and
systems to monitor billing practices and identify false records."
329 Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 298.
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on an equal basis with other time punish supervisors in different ways. First,
supervisory attorneys do not receive the short-term monetary rewards from bill-
ing and generating business. Second, supervision time may actually hurt the su-
pervisors' mobility if time devoted to supervision competes with the time that
supervisors spend building their own portable client base.330  A compensation
system should not punish supervisors and mentors but instead should adequately
compensate them for their contributions to the firm.l
33 1
3. Provide alternative partnership track and other work options.
The study results that should most capture the attention of firm managers
are those related to the interest in reduced-hour arrangements and those related to
the view that billing pressure causes ethical attorneys to leave private practice.
These survey findings reflect the widely reported claim that many associates are
willing to make less money in order to work less. As revealed, many respondents
are interested in reduced-hour arrangements, even if the reduction affects their
treatment and advancement. Many others indicated interest in such arrange-
ments, provided that it did not affect their treatment, even if it affects their ad-
vancement. Evidently, these attorneys are concerned about the stigma and dif-
ferential treatment of associates in alternative positions.
Although many firms are now offering alternative positions such as part-
time and staff attorney positions, attorneys in such positions appear to have less
status and job security than full-time attorneys who are on the partnership track.
Rather than forcing attorneys who are willing to make less to work less into a
category of permanent associates, firms should explore alternatives to the all-or-
nothing promotion to partnership model in which the tournament "winners" be-
come partners and the tournament "losers" remain as employees, but never be-
come partners.332 For example, some New York firms have implemented "regu-
330 "Top lawyers may also be unwilling to devote considerable time to management, recognizing
that they stand to benefit more from portable assets like client relationships and substantive legal
skills than from firm-based assets like efficient management structures and sound financial prac-
tices." Holmes, supra note 168, at 404.
331 If a firm's partners are concerned that partners might fudge on supervision time recorded, the
firm could set annual maximums for supervision time that will be calculated into the objective
portion of the compensation system. The annual maximum could vary depending on the position
that the supervisor held. For example, a member of a firm's ethics committee may have a higher
annual maximum than a member of the firm's recruitment committee. Another way of monitoring
supervision time is to implement some form of peer review in which information is sought from
associates and partners. For a review of the models of peer review, see Fortney, Am IMy Partner's
Keeper?, supra note 230, at 363-70.
332 See Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery: It's the Tournament, Not
the Money, 52 VAND. L. REv. 953, 960 (1999) (describing the "rules" of the tournament model).
For a discussion of the negative consequences of working in permanent associate and staff attorney
positions, see Note, Why Law Firms Cannot Afford to Maintain the Mommy Track, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 1375, 1376-77 (1996). Disadvantages of working part time center on treatment and percep-
tion. As explained by one New Jersey associate, senior attorneys may believe that part-time asso-
ciates are not serious about their work; thus, they treat part-timers more like law clerks than experi-
enced associates. Janice A. Schindler, Breaking New Ground, N.J. LAw., May/June 1991, at 21,
22.
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lated hours positions" which allow associates to work normal business hours (say
9 a.m. to 6 p.m.) and be paid 75% of the salary set for "unregulated class. 33
The challenge is to offer options to those attorneys who want to eventually par-
ticipate as partners on some basis, without requiring that they sacrifice their per-
sonal lives to become a partner in the traditional sense.
334
In exploring alternatives, firm managers should use mixed compensation
systems offering compensation packages that consist partially of money and par-
tially of time and non-monetary rewards.335  Attorney satisfaction can only be
improved if firms offer attorneys a cafeteria approach to advancement and com-
pensation. Those firms that refuse to offer options will continue to face high
levels of attrition.
Finally, firm attorneys must reconsider the meaning of full-time work. As
noted by Professor Martha West, "only in the law do we define full-time work as
60 to 70 hours a week., 336 Instead of thinking of a person who works less than
sixty to seventy hours a week as having a reduced load, maybe working more
than sixty hours a week should be treated as an excessive load.
4. Emphasize human resources management.
These changes to firm compensation systems and employment structures
will directly impact firm culture. In addition, firm managers can take other steps
to change firm culture to one in which associates are treated as valuable human
resources, not commodities.337 Firms that devote resources to personnel man-
agement and communication will be in the best position to address attorney dis-
satisfaction and other harmful effects of billable hour practices.
333 Cotts, supra note 271, at A 18. The "regulated associates" are taken off the partnership track
with an option to return. Id. Small-firm practitioners also are beginning to offer flexible incentive
and compensation packages to their associates. See Jill Schachner Chanen, It Pays to Be Creative,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 70 (referring to a Dallas firm's hybrid package of salary and incentives
"intended to reward associates for working hard but also structured to fit with the firm philosophy
of having a life outside practice").
334 For a number of recommendations for improving work environments and organizations, see
Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash, supra note 221, at 656-62. Menkel-Meadow concludes by warn-
ing that the legal profession's ability "to offer work satisfaction, service goals and professional
pride beyond the earning of high salaries and the peculiar 'high' status... will depend on its will-
ingness to change some of its entrenched belief systems and perhaps outmoded forms of practice."
Id. at 663.
335 Galanter and Palay define "mixed-compensation" firms as those "in which there is a commit-
ment to reduce the traditional big firm's heavy dependence on monetary compensation and instead
to facilitate a mixture of pecuniary and 'life-style' rewards, such as child-rearing leaves, flextime,
part-time work, sabbaticals, time for political or pro-bono work." GALANTER & PALAY, TOURNA-
MENT OF LAWYERS, supra note 255, at 127.
336 Gatland, supra note 194, at 29.
337 Unfortunately, "some partners now view associates as mere labor assets, dispensable workers
in-stead of colleagues and future partners." Louise A. LaMothe, Where Have All the Mentors
Gone?, LITIG., Winter 1993, at 1, 2. "Lawyers should be treated as the investments in long-term
(not short-term) human capital that they are." Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash, supra note 221, at
658.
2000]
UMKC LAW RE VIE W
Effective personnel management requires a commitment of time and re-
sources. As part of effective personnel management, firms should adopt person-
nel policies 338 and establish quality of life and associate retention committees.
Firms should also continuously consider measures to improve personnel man-
agement.339 In addition to providing training in supervision and personnel man-
agement to all supervisory attorneys, firms can change their criteria for admission
to partnership to include demonstration of supervision and management skills.34
Efforts to improve personnel management will pay off in human as well as in
financial terms. 341 As stated by a career services expert, "firms must take a top-
to-bottom look at how they do business and recognize the dollar value of pro-
viding a healthy, sane environment for their most valuable resource - the attor-
neys. 342 By doing so, firms can curb associate attrition and alienation.
B. Law Firms Should Change Billing Practices
Firms can avoid some of the traps of billable hour practice by using alter-
native billing methods.343 For example, forms of value billing can address con-
cerns about inefficiency associated with billable hour practice. Firms and clients
alike are beginning to see mutual benefit in using alternative methods.
More controversial changes involve eliminating high minimum billing re-
quirements or even limiting the number of hours that attorneys work. Although it
may be difficult for regulators to impose limits on the number of hours billed,
338 For an overview of the matters that should be covered in a law firm personnel policy, see Mi-
chael P. Maslanka, Lawyers as Employers: A Few Tips, TEX. LAW., Oct. 19, 1998, at 28.
339 For example, the NALP Keeping the Keepers Report recommends that firms formalize the asso-
ciate review process "to ensure that it occurs on a regular basis." This measure is designed to ad-
dress the common complaint of associates that they receive too little feedback on individual as-
signments and too infrequent or irregular summary evaluations. KEEPING THE KEEPERS REPORT,
supra note 14, at 41.
Id. at 87.
341 As described by one author, "[t]he end result for the law firm will be increased productivity,
increased lawyer and client satisfaction, client and lawyer retention, and a positive firm culture."
McKim, supra note 46, at 186.
342 Gutierrez, supra note 10, at 3. Gutierrez served as director of Law Career Services at the Santa
Clara University School of Law. For a description of firms that have successfully implemented
human resources management, merging "big profits" and "a life outside the office," see Janet L.
Conley, A Great Balance, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 2000, at Al, A11.
343 For a comprehensive report on the ethics of alternative fee arrangements, see the Committee on
Lawyer Business Ethics, Business and Ethics Implications of Alternative Billing Practice: Report
on Alternative Billing Arrangements, 54 Bus. LAW. 175 (1998). Some large firms are using alter-
native fee arrangements, understanding that "the future is not in time sheets." See Peter D. Zeug-
hauser, The New New Math, AM. LAW., Mar. 2000, at 17 (describing firm experiments).
344 See Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash, supra note 221, at 658 n.171 (suggesting that it might be
difficult to regulate the number of hours that attorneys work). Protecting the public health and
safety is a legitimate interest served in limiting the number of hours worked by other service pro-
viders, including physicians, truck drivers and pilots. For a discussion of the regulation of hours
worked by medical residents, see id. Following the death of 18-year-old Libby Zion from an ap-
parent drug interaction, the grand jury criticized the medical profession for requiring interns and
residents to work excessively long hours. Thereafter, New York accepted the recommendation of
the State Department of Health Advisory Committee, adopting regulations that limited hours work
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nothing prevents firms from taking such steps on their own. By voluntarily lim-
iting the number of hours billed, firm managers would communicate that the firm
values quality over quantity and revenue. In the long run, such a move could
impress new clients and solidify relationships with existing clients. 345 Short of
limiting hours, firms could at least abandon high annual billing requirements and
rewarding "high billables" with bonuses. 346 Another modest step would be for
firms to give full credit for pro bono work up to a certain annual limit. Such ini-
tiatives would positively change firm culture and directly address attorney dis-
satisfaction347 and other problems created by the hours derby.348
C. Attorneys Should Change the Regulatory Environment
Various regulatory steps can be taken to address abuses and problems re-
lated to hourly billing practices. Changes can be made to the rules themselves
and to the mechanisms for enforcing the rules. Clarification of rules on billing
can help eliminate questionable practices and eliminate the ability of attorneys to
take advantage of the current lack of clarity in disciplinary rules.
Understanding the role that firm compensation, organization and culture
plays in leading to over billing and other questionable practices, states should
follow the lead of New York in imposing discipline on firms. 349 As Professor
by residents. Joseph Conigliaro et al., Internal Medicine Housestaff and Attending Physician Per-
ceptions of the Impact of the New York State Section 405 Regulations on Working Conditions and
Supervision of Residents in Two Training Programs, J. GEN. INTERNAL MEDICINE, Sept. 1993, at
502, 503. For a review of the benefits and harms of limiting hours, see Michael Green, What (If
Anything) Is Wrong with Residency Overwork?, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, Oct. 1995, at 512
(urging that the strongest argument for reducing hours is ethical in nature - "that overwork inter-
feres with the development of professional values and attitudes that are an essential part of the
moral curriculum of residency").
345 W. Edwards Deming, the founder of the total quality management (TQM) movement, insists
that numerical quotas be eliminated and quality service emphasized. Samuel Wilder, Deming's
Management Methods: A Compass for Legal Administrators?, 13 No. 5 LEGAL MGMT. 45, 49
(1994). For law firms that means de-emphasizing billable hours, expanding alternative billing
arrangements and rewarding client service. Id.
346 Cf Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 298 (recommending that firms abandon the
use of all targets or minimums because "setting incentives to bill more hours than a piece of work
requires should be recognized as unethical"). At the 24th National Conference on Professional
Responsibility in Montreal, Quebec, May 28-30, 1998, Lerman recommended a rule making it
unethical to set billing targets and minimums. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, June 8, 1998, at 271, 272.
347 Not surprisingly, the two firms that were anointed as the nation's happiest in a 1998 mid-level
associate survey were firms that have no billable-hours quota. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Max and
Izzie Awards, 1998, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 29, 1999, at A15 (reporting on the results of a survey con-
ducted by American Lawyer magazine). The winning firms, Boston's Goulston & Storr and Min-
nesota's Faegre & Benson, also frown on "eat what you kill" compensation and reward pro bono.
Id.
348 For a commentary on how emphasizing quality can transform a firm's culture and improve the
quality of life of attorneys, see Jay D. Strother, "Q" is for Quality: ALA Partnership Reveal Facets
of Quality, 13 No. 1 ALA NEWS 6 (1994).
3 The dynamics of modem-day law practice, in which two-thirds of attorneys work in firms and
other organizations, requires the recognition of collective responsibility for some ethical violations.
2000]
UMKC LAW REVIEW
Lerman has recommended, the authority to discipline law firms should "include
(at minimum) the authority to impose discipline for failure to institute proper
training, supervision and monitoring of lawyers and other staff, to ensure compli-
ance with ethical rules, and to impose discipline for failure to report serious mis-
conduct within the'law firn.
3 50
Because billing abuses may be difficult for regulators and clients to detect,
the regulators must enforce the state rule equivalent of Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 8.3.351 To protect those attorneys who act properly, courts, as
regulators of the legal profession, should fashion more protection for whistle
blowers.352 Without such protection for whistle blowers, associates as well as
partners feel as if they are committing professional suicide to report misconduct
by superiors.353
Firm partners may be more likely to improve their internal reporting, train-
ing, and monitoring systems if regulators enforce the state version of Model Rule
5.1(a). Under this rule, a firm partner can be disciplined for failing to "make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Con-
duct., 35 4 By enforcing Rule 5.1 (a), bar regulators signal to firm partners that they
may be disciplined if they close their eyes and do nothing to address and avoid
billing abuses.355
Recognizing the position of attorneys as service providers, regulators
should apply consumer protection statutes to attorneys. If firm compensation
systems include incentive bonuses based on production, legal employers like
For example, a firm that imposes an extraordinarily high billable hour quota should be subject to
discipline. As explained by one billing expert, "when you set the bar too high, you are just moti-
vating people to cheat." ZITRIN & LANGFORD, MORAL COMPASS, supra note 68, at 86.
350 Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 299.
351 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1999) (requiring that attorneys inform "the
appropriate professional authority" when a lawyer has knowledge "that another lawyer has com-
mitted a violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects"). Lerman suggests that
regulators impose discipline on firm managers who fail or delay in reporting misconduct by a firm
attorney. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 299.
352 See Altman, supra note 106, at 209 (describing the precarious position of whistle blowers).
353 In using the term "professional suicide," Lerman notes that the disciplinary "rules provide no
protection to those who comply with the reporting requirement." Mark Hansen, Tender Traps,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 56, 59.
354 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5. l(a) (2000). This rule effectively makes all
firm partners "supervisory" lawyers per se, and accordingly, all partners are responsible for making
reasonable efforts to ensure compliance by firm attorneys. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 5:2:101 (Supp. 1999).
355 Enforcement of state ethics rules based on Model Rules 5.1 and 8.3 may help counter what
Lerman calls "collective denial and minimization of unethical billing practices." Lerman, Blue-
Chip Bilking, supra note 242, at 226 (suggesting that firm attorneys might turn a "blind eye" to
misconduct if they share the resulting income).
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other employers should be held accountable under applicable consumer protec-
tion laws.
356
V. CONCLUSION
Although some changes mentioned may appear to be radical, they do not
call for the restructuring of the way private firms deliver legal services. Rather,
the recommendations urge lawyers to modify organizational assumptions and
regulatory mechanisms, while reaffirming attorneys' commitment to quality and
service. Firm managers who take bold steps may counter the trend to measure
professional success in quantitative and monetary terms. 357 Bar and firm leaders
who address the deleterious effects of high billable hour expectations will im-
prove both the quality of work for clients and the quality of life for firm attor-
neys. With effort, new work and partnership structures can be devised to offer
options so that attorneys need not sell their souls in order to attain professional
success.
356 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A
Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 766 (1990) (urging that "[l]awyers,
in their economic capacities, should be treated no differently than other producers of products or
providers of services"). Menkel-Meadow asks, "[w]hat distinguishes a lawyer lie from any other
kind of service provider lie?" Id. at 775. The answer may be that the lawyer lie is more serious
when it is in the context of a fiduciary relationship.
357 As urged by one commentator:
[L]awyers must move beyond the present mindset in which everything they do
and everyone they encounter are judged in quantitative terms - billable hours,
profits-per-partner, portable client base, annual billings, and so on. This mind-
set must be replaced or supplemented with an attention to qualitative factors -
service to clients, maintaining a reasonable lifestyle, and furthering social jus-
tice.
Douglas E. Litowitz, Young Lawyers and Alienation: A Look at Legal Proletariat, 84 ILL. B.J.,
Mar. 1996, at 144, 149.
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APPENDIX
1999 ASSOCIATE BILLING AND SATISFACTION SURVEY*
INSTRUCTIONS.- Most of these questions can be completed either by checking a
response or by filling in a blank. If a question seems inappropriately or incom-
pletely stated for your situation, please feel free to write an explanation in the
margin or in the comment section at the end of the questionnaire. IF YOU ARE
NOT CURRENTLY AN ASSOCIATE USING HOURLY BILLING, PLEASE SIM-
PLY RETURN THE ENCLOSED POSTCARD.
la. Does your firm have a minimum annual billable hours expectation of
associates?
0I Yes (Answer question lb.)
132 No (Skip to question 2a.)
lb. What is your firm's annual billable hours expectation of associates?
C1 A specific number of hours is required or recommended
(Please specify number of required hours.)
I2 Other (Please describe.)
2a. Before you started work at your current job, what did you learn about
the firm's annual billable hours expectation?
C31 I learned that the firm expected at least the following number of hours
per year: . hours (Answer question 2b.)
02 1 learned that the firm did not have any specific annual billable hours
requirement (Skip to question 3.)
0 3 I was not told anything about the firm's billable hours expectations
(Skip to question 3.)
C'4 Other (Please describe.)
2b. Once you began working at your current firm, how did the actual an-
nual billable hours expectation compare to what you learned during
the hiring process?
1 More billable hours are expected to advance
02 About the same number of hours are expected
[03 Fewer hours are expected to advance
To accommodate publication needs the format has been varied slightly from the original. The
original format version is available from the State Bar of Texas, Department of Research and
Analysis. The complete address appears at the end of the Survey.
[Vol. 69:239
SOUL FOR SALE
3. For the first six months of 1999, approximately how many billable
hours did you record? Hours
0 Check here ifyou did not work full-time for all of the first six
months of 1999, or you were working full-time but did not bill
any hours.
4. For the first six months of 1999, approximately how many total hours
did you devote to law firm work including billable and non-billable
time (such as recruiting and preparing CLE papers)? - Hours
03 Check here ifyou did not work full-time for all of the first six
months of 1999, or you were working full-time but did not bill
any hours.
5. Does your firm accord the same weight to pro bono hours as billable
hours?
01 Yes
12 No
03 I don't know
6. Excluding billing guidelines imposed by clients, does your firm have
written guidelines dealing with billing practices?
31 Yes
032 No
03 I don't know
7a. Does your firm have a policy or system for dealing with the ethical
concerns of attorneys?
01 Yes (Answer question 7b.)
02 No (Skip to question 8.)
03 I don't know (Skip to question 8.)
7b. Which of the following does your firm use to address ethical concerns
of attorneys? (Check all that apply.)
01 Designated ethics counsel
02 Ethics committee
0'3 Written policy encouraging reporting of misconduct
0"4 Scheduled in-firm meetings
035 Scheduled training on ethics issues
0-6 Other (Please describe.)
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8. Approximately how much training or instruction has your firm pro-
vided you on billing practices?
C31 None
C-2 Less than one hour
CI3 One to two hours
[- 4 More than two hours
9. In law school, approximately how much class time was devoted to dis-
cussing the ethics of attorneys billing by the hour?
C31 None
C32 Less than one hour
C33 One to two hours
1- 4 More than two hours
10. During the last year, have you ever billed two clients for work per-
formed at the same time (e.g., billing one client for reviewing a deposi-
tion while billing another client for travel time)?
01 Yes [32 No
11. When you are revising and recycling a document prepared for another
client, do you bill the current client for more than the revision time?
(When answering this question, assume that you are billing the current cli-
ent on an hourly basis.)
C 1 Yes 32 No
12. Has your firm or supervising attorney given you guidance on the prac-
tices described in the previous two questions?
C31 Yes C32 No
13. During the last year, how often has your supervising attorney ques-
tioned your billing entries?
C31 Never [32 Occasionally 33 Frequently
14. Do you know about ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379, dealing with
the ethics of Billing for Professional Fees, Disbursements, and Other
Expenses? Among other things, this opinion addresses "double bill-
ing."
C31 I have read it.
[-2 I have heard about it, but have not read it.
- 3 I have not heard about it.
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15a. Have you ever had concerns about the billing practices of other attor-
neys in your firm?
0 1 Yes (Answer question 15b.)
02 No (Skip to question 16a.)
15b. How did you handle your concerns about other attorneys' billing prac-
tices? (Check all that apply.)
0I1 1 did nothing
02 I discussed the matter with a supervisor or managing attorney
03 I discussed the matter with another associate
04 I discussed the matter with the attorney whose practices I questioned
05 Other (Please describe.)
16a. Does your firm allow associates to arrange alternative work schedules?
01 Yes (Answer question 16b.)
02 No (Skip to question 17.)
03 I don't know (Skip to question 17.)
16b. If your firm allows associates to arrange alternative work schedules,
which of the following arrangements does the firm allow? (Check all
that apply.)
01 Flextime
02 Part-time
03 Work-at-home/telecommuting
04 Other (Please describe.)
17. In your work, which ONE of the following are you most interested in
attaining? (Please check only one response.)
0 1 Paying off student loans
032 Rewarding work
03 Status and prestige
04 Financial rewards
0 5 Intellectual challenges
06 Full partner participation
07 Training and experience
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18. Would you be interested in working fewer hours in exchange for lower
compensation?
C3 Yes, regardless of its impact on my treatment or advancement at the
firm
02 Yes, provided that it would not adversely affect my treatment or ad-
vancement at the firm
C33 Yes, provided that it would not affect my treatment, even if it affects
my advancement at the firm
04 No, because I'm interested in maximizing my income
C35 No, because inevitably such an arrangement will affect my treatment
and advancement at the firm
19a. Are you interested in changing employers during the next two years?
C I Yes (Answer question 19b.)
02 No (Skip to question 20.)
19b. If you are interested in changing employers, what type of job would
you prefer above others? (Please check only one response.)
O31 Government job
02 Private practice with a smaller firm
033 Private practice with a larger firm
034 Corporate counsel position
15 Non-legal job
C36 Public interest job
C37 Other (Please describe.)
20. Which ONE of the following factors would be MOST INFLUENTIAL
in causing you to change jobs? (Please check only one response.)
[31 More respectful treatment
02 More interesting work
033 Reduction of work hours
C34 Enhanced training and supervision
05 Increased compensation
036 Meaningful expectation of partnership
037 Other (Please specify.)
21. How much have family and/or non-work priorities influenced your
choice of employment?
031 A great deal 032 Somewhat 033 None or very little
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22. Does your firm have a policy or a system for handling employee (in-
cluding attorney) complaints and employment concerns?
3 I Yes C-2No 031 don't know
23. Which of the following BEST describes the morale among associates at
your firm?
311 Excellent El2Good El3Average El4Poor El5Very poor
24. Rate your firm's efforts to assist attorneys to balance their work and
personal life.
031 Excellent E' 2Good [] 3Average C34Poor C35Nonexistent
25a. Has billable hours pressure taken a toll on your personal life?
[31 Yes (Answer question 25b.) [32 No (Skip to question 26.)
25b. Which of the following describes how billable hours pressure has taken
a toll on your personal life? (Please check all that apply.)
El 1 get sick more often than before I worked for the firm
E32 I have more trouble sustaining an intimate relationship than I used to
El3 I have less time for my friends and family
04 Other (Please describe.)
26. Overall, how satisfied are you with your current job?
[3 I Very satisfied
C2 Somewhat satisfied
03 Somewhat dissatisfied
04 Very dissatisfied
27. For 1999, how much vacation time will you actually take?
311 Less than one week or none
El 2 1-2 weeks
03 3-4 weeks
El 4 5 weeks or more
28. What is your average alcohol consumption?
3 1 None C34 1-2 drinks a day
02 One drink a week or less 05 3-5 drinks a day
03 Several drinks a week 036 6 or more drinks a day
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29. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following
statements. (Pick a number from the following scale and write it in the
space beside each statement.)
Strongly Somewhat Neither Agree Somewhat Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5
-Clear billing guidelines would help eliminate questionable billing prac-
tices.1
__ Clear billing guidelines would help attorneys who want to practice ethi-
cally. 2
I must sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to attain partnership
status. 3
Attorneys tend to rationalize and justify questionable billing practices. 4
Working long hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and
creatively. 5
-My income and advancement within the firm are principally based on the
number of hours that I bill and collect.6
___ Because of billable hour pressure, I don't have time to participate in pro
bono and public service activities. 7
Because of billable hour pressure, I minimize my participation in continu-
ing legal education programs and ethics training.8
Because of the pressure on partners to bill and generate business, partners
in my firm do not provide the mentoring and training that I need and
want.9
I feel stressed and fatigued most of the time. 10
Most of the feedback I get from my supervisors relates to billable hours.1 1
-Reduced-hour arrangements communicate that an attorney can't compete
and hurt the attorney's chances for long term success at the firm.12
Billing pressure causes ethical and competent attorneys to leave private law
practice. 13
I wish that I had selected a profession other than the law. 14
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Background Information
30a. Is hourly billing the principal method of billing used by your firm?
C31 Yes (Skip to question 31.) 02 No (Answer question 30b.)
30b. If hourly billing is not the principal method of billing used by your
firm, what is the principal billing method used?
01 Contingent fee 0]2 Flat fee 033 Other(Please describe.)
31. Of the fees you charge clients, approximately what percentage derives
from billable hour work?
031 Less than 50% 03250 to 74% 033 75 to 99% 04100%
32. What is the size of your law firm including all branch offices?
031 2-5 attorneys 034 25-60 attorneys
02 6-10 attorneys 05 61-100 attorneys
03 11-24 attorneys 0I6 More than 100 attorneys
33. What is your current position in the firm?
031 Associate on a partnership track
032 Staff attorney not on the partner track
03 Contract attorney
034 Part-time attorney
03 5 Other (Please describe.)
34. How long have you worked in your current firm?
0 1 Less than 12 months 04 61-84 months
032 12-36 months 0]5 More than 84 months
03 37-60 months
35. What is your age?
1 , Under 30 034 41-45
032 30-35 C35 Over 46
033 36-40
36. In what year were you first licensed to practice law?
37. In what Texas county is your firm located?
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38. What is your gender?
01 Male 02 Female
39. What is your race/ethnicity?
C31 Caucasian/Anglo
02 African American/Black
03 Hispanic/Latino
04 Asian/Pacific Islander
C"5 Native American Indian
C36 Other (Please specify.)
40. What is your marital status?
031 Married, no children 03 Divorced or separated
02 Married with children 034 Single or widowed
41. Are your currently working:
01 Full-time? 02 Part-time?
42. On average, how many hours per week do you devote to the practice of
law? (Please include billable and non-billable time.)
0 1 Fewer than 20 C35 50-55
02 20-29 C36 56-60
03 30-39 037 More than 60
034 40-49
43. In 1998, what was your pre-tax income (including bonus) from your
law firm employment?
01 Less than $50,000
032 $50,000 - $84,999
073 $85,000 - $124,999
C34 $125,000 - $159,999
0 5 Over $160,000
Please use the space below for any comments you have on any of the issues
covered on this survey. Attach additional pages if desired.
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Thank you for taking the time to respond to this questionnaire. Please return
your questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid return envelope or mail to:
State Bar of Texas, Department of Research and Analysis, P.O. Box 12487,
Austin, TX 78711-2487 or FAX it to 512/463-1475. We would appreciate re-
ceiving your completed questionnaire no later than April 14, 2000. The en-
closed postcard should be mailed separately. This will let us know that you
have responded but will assure the anonymity of your answers.

